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The authority to raise and spend money is one of the most expansive and
fundamental of all Congress's enumerated powers, particularly when
Congress chooses to impose conditions on those who wish to receive its cash.
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The consensus modern view of this "conditional spending" is that its
unfettered use threatens the diversity and accountability goals of "our
federalism." As a result, nearly all commentators support either direct or
indirectjudge-made limits on conditional spending. These claims, I argue,
rest on a set of largely unexamined assumptions about the political
motivations, budgetary situation, and other incentives of the state officials who
must decide whether or not to acceptfederal offers.
Thus, this Article attempts to begin a truly in-depth study of the political
economy of state decisions to acceptfederal funds. In particular,I focus on
state officials' own incentives to preserve diversity and accountability, albeit
for self-interested reasons. For example, I document and model the ways in
which opportunities to impose hidden taxes, or to export taxes onto outsiders,
may encourage officials to turn down federal grants that might diminish state
autonomy. I also examine closely the available empirical evidence on the
actualfiscal situation of states, concluding there is no evidence states are in
such dire financial straits that they are likely ever obliged to accept federal
funds. In sum, I argue that the current consensus is mistaken about the need
for constraining conditional federal grants. Thus, there is presently little
evidence in favor ofjudicial intervention in freely chosen state decisions to
accept grants.
INTRODUCTION

Although it is a familiar point that debates over the most appealing way to
read a statute may turn largely on empirical questions,1 not all statutory debates
have yet been subject to careful examination of the underlying empirics. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that conditions attached by Congress to
federal grants offered to state or local governments should be interpreted
strictly against Congress, even where the plaintiff suing to enforce the
condition is a third party.2 I argue here that this position can be justified, if at
all, only by a showing that there are defects in the bargaining process between
Congress and its grantees, and that those defects threaten values the courts are
charged with protecting. Defenders of the Court's approach have suggested
that states bargain from a position of weakness, and that their representatives
have strong incentives to ignore the federalism values protected by the
Constitution. 3 In this Article, I attempt to subject these assumptions to more
rigorous scrutiny, arguing that officials in fact have their own self-serving
incentives to preserve federalism values. In addition, I survey recent empirical
evidence suggesting that officials typically have access to the resources to
pursue their goals contrary to Congress's entreaties.

1 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 885, 889-90 (2003).
2 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
3 See infra Part I.B.
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Given the scale of so-called "conditional" federal spending, and its place in
our constitutional structure, these questions are urgent ones.4 A vast array of
domestic programs depend, in one way or another, on the states' willingness to5
accept both federal dollars and the terms and conditions that go with them.
The question, then, of how or whether the6federal judiciary should police these
grants is a correspondingly important one.
4 Of course, I am not the first to note the importance of spending legislation. See, e.g.,

David Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE L.J. 1, 2 (1994); Edward M. Gramlich,
Alternative FederalPoliciesfor Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Comparisonof
Their Effects, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 119, 119-20 (1968); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,Money and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 847-49 (1979); Thomas R.
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SuP.
CT. REV. 85, 86; Albert J. Rosenthal, ConditionalFederalSpending and the Constitution, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06 (1987); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending
Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1188 (2001).
I These programs include: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1407(a)(1) (2006); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2006); No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 631 l(a)(1) (2006); Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396c
(2006); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7420 (2006). Lynn Baker and Mitchell Berman also observe the
importance of conditional spending doctrine for the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006), Congress's
latest effort to require states to take greater account of the free exercise claims of individuals
than the Supreme Court is willing to afford. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting
Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever
Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 495-97 (2003) [hereinafter Baker &
Berman, Getting Off the Dole].
For some basic discussions of the origins and structures of cooperative federalism, see
MORTON GRODZINs, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED

7-10 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN,
OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 10-11 (1964); Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block
Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism:A ConceptualMap of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 297, 300-24 (1996); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecture
for CooperativeFederalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-73 (2001).
6 In addition to debates over conditional spending per se, there has also been a fair
amount of discussion of the fiscal dimensions of state and federal relations in the context of
a related problem: the so-called "unfunded mandate." This scholarship, for the most part,
focuses on the possibility that Congress is obligated to provide funds to accompany any
regulatory demands it imposes on state or local governments. See Robert W. Adler,
Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1231-54
(1997); David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3-5 (1995); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New
(New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 103-11
(1996); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1355, 1356 (1993). But see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May
Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
STATES
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The Supreme Court's decision in Arlington CentralSchool DistrictBoard of
Education v. Murphy offers an occasion to revisit the question of judicial
oversight of conditional federal spending. 7 Arlington held, in essence, that the
word "costs" in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") did
not include the cost incurred by prevailing plaintiff parents to hire experts as
part of their litigation to secure a free and appropriate education for their
child. 8 By the time the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the best reading of
the statute was somewhat unclear; there was both clear legislative history
pointing one way and a series of judicial interpretations, decided between the
enactment of the statute and 2006, pointing in the other direction. 9
The Arlington Court resolved its interpretive problem by reading the IDEA
strictly against Congress, a technique sometimes called the "clear statement
rule."' 0 That rule, dating to the early 1980s but somewhat unevenly enforced
since,I' holds that courts may enforce against states the conditions of a federal
grant only if those conditions are stated "unambiguously" in the statute. 12 As
scholars have recognized, the rule serves as a sort of second-best constitutional
constraint on federal expansion; rather than directly striking down strings
attached to federal grants, the Court simply interprets them penuriously.13
The clear statement rule seems to depend on an assumption that state

1001, 1081-87 (1995); Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other
Regulations, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 386 (1999). This Article considers, in effect, the
reciprocal question: how best should we interpret conditions Congress imposes when it in
fact does fund its "mandates"?
I Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct. 2455 (2006). For other
early commentary on the Arlington decision, see Ilya Somin, A False Dawnfor Federalism:
Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 20052006, at 113, 131-33 (Mark K. Moller ed., 2006) [hereinafter Somin, False Dawn].
8 Arlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2457.
9 Id. at 2459-63.
10Id. at 2459, 2461.
1 See Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 465; Brian Galle, Getting
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional
Grants of FederalFunds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162-66 (2004) [hereinafter Galle, Getting
Spending]; Smith, supra note 4, at 1189-90.
12Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465-67 (1991).
13 See Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive ConstitutionalReview, 75 S.CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1303-04 (2002); David
Freeman Engstrom, DrawingLines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A FunctionalAnalysis
of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197,
1242-46 (2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 624 (1992);
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2097, 2122-23 (2002).
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decisions are not to be trusted.' 4 Rational actors would only accept offers they
perceive as producing a net benefit for themselves (or perhaps their
constituents). If state officials were well-advised, and really cared about the
structural constraints on federal power some see in the Constitution, then there
would be no need for the clear statement rule. 15 The officials would refuse to
accept offers that, in the long run, would undermine their own autonomy,
diminish the diversity that leads to good national policy-making, or otherwise
undercut what we think of as the values of federalism. 16 Or, they would at
least decline such offers unless the benefits of cooperation would outweigh
17
those costs.
Of course, public officials at any level are unlikely to be perfectly rational,
or to represent perfectly the interests of their constituents.' 8 Instead, we have a
world of second-bests. Indeed, it is widely understood that the Constitution
itself is designed as a tool for channeling the less-than-perfect impulses of
public officials into routes that nonetheless lead to acceptable outcomes. 19
What is not widely understood, or to date much studied, is whether such
second-best channels funnel state and local actors when they decide whether to
accept federal funds.20 The Supreme Court has barely nodded at the
possibility.2 1 The existing academic literature argues almost exclusively that

"4 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 635; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic
Searchfor a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 867, 911 (1999);
John C. Yoo, The JudicialSafeguards ofFederalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1319 (1997).
11 For a more detailed analysis on this point, see infra Part I.B.
16 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why

State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 862
(1998) [hereinafter Hills, CooperativeFederalism]; Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox
of Federalism: The Casefor JudicialRestriction of FederalSubsidies to State Governments,
90 GEO. L.J. 461, 465 (2002) [hereinafter Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox].
17 See Hills, CooperativeFederalism, supra note 16, at 874.
18 See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 137-38
(Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent
Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political
Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103, 103-06, 128 (1990).
19 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1332-33 (1994); Daryl J. Levinson, EmpireBuilding Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 921-22 (2005);
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to ConstitutionalTheory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 480-87 (1988).
20 For an exception, see John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights:
A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 121 (2004)
[hereinafter McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights] (arguing that state
institutional structures in fact are insufficient to preserve federalism values). I take issue
with this point herein.
21 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (contending that "powerful
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the public cannot expect state officials to act in ways that preserve federalism
values.2" States, in these accounts, are strapped for cash on account of
competition for mobile capital and federal siphoning of scarce tax dollars, or
otherwise in need of some central-govemment resolution to their collectiveaction dilemmas. 23 State officials must grab whatever funds or other
nationalized solutions are available in order to provide the services their
constituents demand. 24 Since the costs that flow from these acceptances arise
down the road, or are difficult for constituents to notice, the officials pay them
little heed relative to the value of the offered dollars or services. 25 As a result,
voters later inappropriately blame state officials for decisions that Congress
26
putatively imposed.
In other words, courts and scholars generally believe that state officials will
not tum down federal grants on their own in order to preserve a diverse
national market for legal rules. Indeed, even scholars who generally are not
sympathetic to arguments for judicial enforcement of federalism values appear
to accept this claim. These other scholars, most prominently Professor Tribe,
support the clear statement rule. 27 They argue that binding states by the terms
incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal
structure to be in their personal interests").
22 See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1933 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Spending]; McCoy & Friedman, supra

note 4, at 124; McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note 20, at 90;
Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 462-63, 484, 496; Somin, FalseDawn,

supra note 7, at 137; Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV.917, 958
(1985); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheersfor Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 138592 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers].

23 See Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1936 (describing how there is "no
competitor to the federal government" to whom states could turn for alternative revenue);
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 86 (explaining how the federal tax burden has
increased, making it harder to raise state revenue and thus increasing state reliance on
federal funds); Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 468 (describing the
horizontal competition between states because dissatisfied residents can move to another
state); Stewart, supra note 22, at 971 (explaining that states are subject to "nearly
irresistible" internal pressures from taxpayers and external pressures from competing states
to accept federal funds).
24 Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1936-39; McCoy & Friedman, supra

note 4, at 86, 124; Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 484; Stewart, supra
note 22, at 971.
25 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124; cf McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs.
States'Rights,supra note 20, at 94-100 (arguing that because of "rational ignorance" among
constituents, government officials undervalue costs of burdens associated with acceding to
federal objectives).
26 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 125 (citing as an example, the fact that
voters perceive the minimum drinking age law to be imposed by state government); Stewart,
supra note 22, at 958.
27 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
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of grant conditions arguably unclear at the time of acceptance will make it
more difficult for voters to police offers and acceptances. Further, granting
final say over grant terms to courts is said to diminish states' continuing
political influence over those terms. As I attempt to show, these claims assume
defects in the process of state decisions. The voter activism story presumes
that officials imperfectly protect federalism concerns absent close monitoring
by the public. And, absent some story about procedural flaws in state decisionmaking, it is hard to see how the state-political-influence account explains why
states should in effect be forbidden to assume the risk that in the future they
will enjoy diminished influence over federal law.
My central argument here is that the available economic data belie, or at
best do not support the claims that state officials will fail to preserve diversity,
or that federal grants wrongly obscure official accountability. As a result, I
maintain that decisions applying the clear statement rule, as well as more direct
limits on conditional spending, are hard to defend. I examine the public
finance literature on state and local fiscal health, and state and local official
responses to grants from higher-level governments. I find, among other
significant information, that critics of unconstrained conditional spending seem
to greatly underestimate the capacity of state and local governments to raise
their own revenues. In many cases the perceived political cost to officials of
raising money locally will be less than the perceived cost of federal grant
conditions, even if officials heavily discount those conditions. In those
situations, the officials will refuse the grant unless there is an increase in its
perceived benefits. In effect, states own-revenue capacity is an independent
check on federal expansion by means of conditional spending. Relatedly,
critics overlook the indirect fiscal supports (and, therefore, indirect constraints
on Congress's power to utilize conditional spending) that flow to states
through the federal tax system.
If local revenues are to be the prime check against federal expansion, it is
important to know whether those revenues are large enough to matter.
Therefore, I also examine available data on state fiscal capacity - that is, the
ability of the States to raise enough money to provide the services demanded
by their citizens. For a variety of reasons, direct measures of fiscal capacity
are difficult or controversial. 28 However, I examine one possible indirect

64-65 (2005); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 479-81 (2d
ed. 1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1175-76 (3d ed.
2000); Engdahl, supra note 4, at 71; William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State
Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1069,
1078-79 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing FederalismAfter Raich: The Casefor Clear
Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 823, 826, 833 (2005); Smith, supra note 4, at
1203-04; Somin, FalseDawn, supra note 7, at 115; Stewart, supra note 22, at 966-69; Cass
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 339 (2000); Young, Two
Cheers, supra note 22, at 1354-55.
28 See infra note 231.
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measure, the existence of the "flypaper effect." The "flypaper effect" is the
economic term for grant-recipient expenditures exceeding what classic
economic theory would predict to be the amount spent as a result of the grant money "sticks where it hits" instead of being diverted back to tax cuts. 2 9 This
might be evidence of the inability of states to raise all the money they need to
provide services, or at least an indication that federal revenue-raising is more
efficient than state taxation. However, after canvassing the existing literature,
I find no real support for those explanations, although I acknowledge that they
remain at least theoretical possibilities.
In short, I do not expect to refute for certain the claims and implicit
assumptions of the proponents of judge-made limits on federal conditional
spending. However, I do establish that no convincing evidence presently exists
to demonstrate that the reasonably rational decisions of self-serving officials in
fact undermine federalism. As I explain, the burden is on proponents of
judicial intervention to explain why judges should set aside the freely-made
decisions of uncoerced public officials. And so far I see no signs that such a
burden can be met.
Part I of this Article sets out the Arlington holding as well as the general
judicial and academic dispute over the proper scope and interpretation of
spending legislation. Part I.B elaborates on my claim that all the arguments in
favor of limiting spending legislation, including Professor Tribe's defense of
the clear statement rule, rely on an underlying assumption that state officials
cannot be trusted to protect federalism values when deciding whether to accept
a conditional grant. Part II subjects this assumption to close examination,
noting that existing accounts of state official behavior are incomplete in a
number of respects, including their failure to consider the possibility that
officials can replace costly federal grants with local taxes that at least appear
less costly to their constituents. Thus, Part III introduces a simple economic
model of the substitutability of local taxes for federal grants. Part IV suggests
other theoretical reasons to believe official decisions to accept grants tend to
preserve core federalism values. Part V goes a step further, contrasting
prevailing assumptions about voter confusion and state influence with the
available empirical evidence. Synthesizing a number of studies of state fiscal
behavior, I show there is no evidence that state officials are in any meaningful
sense constrained to accept federal grants.
I.

CONDITIONAL SPENDING:

A

BRIEF BACKGROUND

When Congress distributes money to other persons or entities, it typically
does so subject to conditions. 30 This conditional spending is a major avenue
29 James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, J. ECON.

PERSP., Autumn 1995, at 217, 218 (attributing the phrase to economist Arthur Okun).
31 See Laura S. Jensen, Federalism, Individual Rights, and the Conditional Spending
Conundrum, 33 POLITY 259, 277 (2000).

For an overview of the structure of conditional
spending (albeit not an especially sympathetic one), see DAVID B. WALKER, TOWARD A
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for federal regulation of state, local, and private actors. 31 Congress's authority
to attach these conditions to its largesse is usually said to derive from Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, commonly called the Spending Clause, which
grants Congress "Power To lay and collect Taxes... to pay the Debts and
32
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare.
For the most part, courts have not directly limited the scope of Congress's
power to enact legislation in the form of conditional spending. 33 In the seminal
case, South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court set out some loose restrictions
34
on conditional grants but acknowledged they were largely aspirational.
The issue instead lies in how courts should interpret the terms of conditional
grants. In a series of decisions starting in 1981 with Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court has declared it will not hold
states to the conditions attached to a statute rooted in the Spending Clause
'35
unless those conditions are stated "unambiguously.
The scope of this doctrine remains, after twenty-five years, still rather
confused. 36 The Court has not decided whether or not "unambiguous"
37
It
conditions can be stated in regulations enacted in furtherance of a statute.
has given conflicting signals over whether courts should consider legislative
history in determining the clarity of a statute. 38 And, crucially, its decisions
reveal an ongoing and unresolved tension in the underlying rationale for the

FUNCTIONING FEDERALISM 144-51 (1981).
31 See THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS
99-115 (1990); DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD

WASHINGTON 182, 189-91 (1995).
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
33 See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that

"Kansas bears a very heavy burden in seeking to have the PRWORA [Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act] declared unconstitutional" and
discussing the lack of recent cases where conditions have been invalidated); Baker &
Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 466, 524; Smith, supra note 4, at 1196-97.
34 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); see Baker & Berman, Getting Off the
Dole, supra note 5, at 466-69; Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending
Power, and FederalCriminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2003). 1 have argued in
an earlier work that this is a sensible conclusion. Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at
229-30. It is true that on its face the Spending Clause might allow Congress to enact
legislation that would go beyond the limits of its other main sources of authority, such as the
Commerce Clause. But this fact is not troubling, given that Congress must literally pay a
price, both in treasury dollars and political capital, for such expansions. Id. at 169-70, 18791, 230. Thus, some of Congress's limits, as under the Commerce Clause, are textual, while
others, as in the case of the Spending Clause, are structural or fiscal. Id. at 170.
35 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

16 See supra note 11.
37 See Smith, supra note 4, at 1188-89.
38 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 165.
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Pennhurstrule.3 9
A.

UnderstandingArlington

The Court's decision in Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy is typical in these regards.40 Arlington dealt with

whether the word "costs" in the IDEA included the costs incurred by plaintiff
parents for services rendered by experts.4 1 The structure of the IDEA is that
Congress allocates money to state and local education agencies in exchange for
those entities' agreement to comply with the IDEA's requirements. 42 The
IDEA's primary requirement is that the agencies ensure students with
disabilities receive a "free [and] appropriate" education. 43 Parents can
challenge an alleged failure to comply with the
IDEA, and, if they prevail, can
44
recover their "costs," such as attorney's fees.
The Arlington held that the word "costs" does not "unambiguously" include
the costs of expert services rendered to prevailing plaintiffs. 45 On its face, this
determination was less strange than it seems at first. There had been a series of
earlier Supreme Court interpretations of the term "costs" in similar statutes, in
each of which the Court found that "costs" was a term of art meant to exclude
expert fees. 4 6 On the other hand, in the case of the IDEA there was a
Conference Committee Report stating
that the Committee understood "costs"
47
to include expert fees in this context.
The Court resolved this conflict by invoking the Pennhurstrule, explaining:
"[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the
nature of a contract," and therefore, to be bound by "federally imposed
conditions," recipients of federal funds must accept them "voluntarily and
knowingly." States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they
are "unaware" or which they are "unable to ascertain." Thus, in the
present case, we must view the IDEA from the perspective of a state
'9 See id. at 162-66.
40 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
41 See id. at 2457.
42 See id. at 2458-59. Congress appears not to have depended entirely on its Spending

Clause power in enacting the IDEA, however. See id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(stating that the IDEA was also enacted under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
43 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(l)(A) (2000).
44 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).

45 Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463.
46 See id. at 2461-63.
47 H.R. REP. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 1807, 1808. A
Conference Committee Report is a report by the committee of the House and Senate whose
job it is to reconcile any differences between the two Houses' versions of the bill. For a
more detailed discussion of how conference reports may be utilized in statutory
interpretation, see ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 46-68 (1997).
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official who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the State
should accept IDEA funds and the obligations that go with those funds.
We must ask whether such a state official would clearly understand that
one of the obligations of the Act is the obligation to compensate
prevailing parents for expert fees. In other words, we must ask whether
the IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue ....48
The Court later added, "[i]n a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a
majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly
told regarding the conditions ....",49 Thus, the Court reasoned that since it

was unclear whether the Conference Committee report could overcome other
indications that "costs" did not include expert fees, Pennhurst meant the State
50
had to prevail.
The puzzle here is that there is every reason to think that state officials in
fact did clearly understand their obligations under the statute.
State
representatives were intimately involved in the bargaining process that lead to
the enactment of the "costs" provision. 51 The IDEA would have been pointless
if the states would not accept its terms, and accordingly state negotiators had a
prominent place at the table during its drafting. 52 Therefore, the states'
representatives were perhaps in a better position than the Court to understand
the product of those negotiations.5 3 Indeed, the States lobbied against the

48 Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2459 (citations omitted).
41Id. at

2463.

50Id.
5' See Handicapped Children's Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1523 Before the
Subcomm. on Select Education of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 23-28
(1985) (statements of National School Boards Association) [hereinafter NSBA House
Statement]; id. at 10, 13, 17 (statement of Linus Wright, General Superintendent of Schools,
Dallas, Texas, representing the American Association of School Administrators);
Handicapped Children'sProtection Act of 1985: Hearing on S.415 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 61-79
(1985) (statement of National School Boards Association).
52 Cf NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES

EDUCATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 5-6 (1995) (stating that the decision to structure
the predecessor to the IDEA as a federal spending statute came in response to state advocate
arguments that states could not themselves bear the costs).
53Cf Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory
Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79
TUL. L. REv. 955, 967-70 (2005) (claiming that statutes may be intended for interpretation
by an audience with already-developed understandings of the statute and its context that
exceed the courts' own understandings); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the
Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 511 (2005) (arguing that agencies may have superior information about
the meaning of a statute because they were involved in its drafting, and therefore should be
encouraged to use that information in the interpretive process); Peter L. Strauss, When the
Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 88:875

inclusion of the expert fees language. 54 Having failed to keep that language
out, they nonetheless accepted Congress's money. At a minimum, when they
began accepting money under the IDEA, New York officials had to know they
did so at a substantial risk that they would have to pay expert fees. 55 They
certainly were not "unaware" of the condition or "unable to ascertain" it. What
they were unaware of was the exact likelihood that the condition would be
upheld by a court.
To put this point a different way, consider the claim that uncertainty about
legal outcomes is indistinguishable from other forms of risk. This is a
common point in, for example, scholarship on the law of takings, and in
debates about the proper transitional rules when laws change. 56 A regulatory
decision can wipe out a home's value as surely as a hurricane. When
individuals make decisions about when to invest or enter into contracts, if
rational, they will attempt to account for potential disasters both legal and
natural. 57 In a properly functioning market, these risks are capitalized into the
value of property. 58 Alternatively, the seller can insure the buyer against

the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321, 329-31 (1990) (discussing
how agencies have particularized knowledge about legislative history because they are
"almost wholly the creature[s] of [their] statutes").
54 See NSBA House Statement, supra note 51, at 25 ("[R]egarding the definition of fees
and other expenses... we would prefer to see the committee adopt similar language to that
used in other pieces of civil rights legislation, for instance, section 1988 ...that says the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee ..
(emphasis added)).
11 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 176; cf Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S.
773, 790-91 (1983) (holding that the conditional spending statute need not provide "notice"
to the State of particular remedies that will be available against it under the statute). The
notice explanation is particularly puzzling in light of the fact that New York's IDEA-tied
funding was re-authorized annually by Congress. So, regardless of whether the obligations
of the statute were clear at the time the IDEA was enacted, they were overwhelmingly clear
more than a decade later in 2000, when New York accepted its yearly appropriation and the
Murphys prevailed in court. See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp.
2d 354, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (ordering Arlington School District to pay for the cost of
private schooling for the Murphys' child), affid, 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002); Brief for
Respondents at 30-34, Arlington, 126 S.Ct. 2455 (No. 05-18) (arguing that, through 2002,
numerous court decisions and administrative and legislative documents had interpreted the
IDEA to impose expert costs on the losing government party). For more extensive
discussion of the notice argument, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in
the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
56 For the early definitive work, see generally Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L,
REv. 1165 (1967).
" See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509,
522-27 (1986) (suggesting that private actors should recognize legal changes may affect
their investments).
58 Cf Avishai Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules of
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losses, such as by selling her a warranty.5 9 In that case, the purchase price is
higher. Therefore, buying risky property without insurance is simply a wager:
the property comes at a bargain price, and, if the risk never materializes, the
60
purchaser has won her bet.
The challenge for Arlington and its advocates lies in articulating why states
should be denied the opportunity to make these kinds of bargain purchases. 61
Just as a property buyer might elect to forego buying a warranty, states may
choose to accept a federal grant subject to the risk of legal change that will
reduce the value of their bargain. 62 In Kathleen Sullivan's classic formulation,
restraints of this kind convert the right not to accept an offer into a duty not to

Transition, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1581, 1596 (1984). That is, the value of property should
increase or decrease to reflect the risk of gains or losses.
9 See Kaplow, supra note 57, at 527-28.
60 See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283, 294 (1981). There is considerable nuance to this claim. Barbara H. Fried,
Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 129-31 & n. 11(2003).
61 Cf Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (describing
conditional grants as the outcome of a bargain between states and Congress); Craig Volden,
Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational
Political Decision, 37 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 209, 228 (2007) (describing bargaining

between Congress and state governors over conditions of AFDC grants).
I assume here that it is reasonably evident that a state, unlike an individual, will be fully
informed about the relevant legal context of its decision to accept an offer. Cf Craig, supra
note 53, at 1011-12, 1038 (observing that statutes governing a technically sophisticated
audience need not be read according only to plain language because the audience is already
familiar with the policy nuance of potential meanings).
62 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 346-47 (arguing that bargainers
should be free to exchange constitutional privileges for other consideration).
For example, in the lawmaking process that spawned the Arlington litigation, the states
and Congress apparently agreed to leave the wording of the statute somewhat ambiguous as
to expert fees, but to include a clear directive about fees in the Conference Report. See
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2006) (claiming
that the conference report, in its interpretation of the statute's fee language, was attempting
to "depart from ordinary meaning" (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
92 n.5 (1991))). But see Brief for Respondents at 33-42, Arlington, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 0518) (arguing that there was strong reason to believe at the time of enactment that the
language of the statute itself was not especially ambiguous, but rather that it was relatively
clear to the authors that it included fees). One plausible interpretation of this sequence of
events is that Congress and the states in effect agreed to disagree, or at a minimum, to take
the chance that courts would decide how best to read the language of the statute. Yet
Arlington rejects the very possibility of political agreements by the states to be governed by
later interpretations, even where that seems to have been the intent of their negotiators. That
is, the Arlington Court is willing to enforce only "what the States are clearly told," rather
than what they are arguably or likely told. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463.
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accept an offer. 63 In effect, we have limited state sovereignty in the name of
state sovereignty.
Arlington therefore raises more questions than it answers. We may think
states should largely be free to arrange their own affairs free of judicial control.
However, that seems untrue of state decisions to take risks about the meaning
of federal grants. What is there about state decisions to accept legal
uncertainty that is different from, and more suspect than, state decisions to
accept any other form of uncertainty?
B.

The Defective-BargainingTheories of the ClearStatement Rule

Arlington and Pennhurst, as we have just seen, beg the question why we
should prohibit states from entering into bargains subject to some legal
uncertainty. The Supreme Court and commentators, however, have elsewhere
offered four distinct, if related, justifications. The four defenses draw on
Kathleen Sullivan's architecture for thinking about waivers of constitutional
rights. Professor Sullivan suggests that we can justify setting aside bargains
for constitutionally-protected rights where there are failures in the political or
bargaining process, 64 where there are third-party effects, 65 or where individual
63 Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419-21,

1486-87 (1989); see also Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267,426 (1998).
64 Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1480-83, 1495. That, of course, is the classic account of the
basic justification for judicial review formulated by John Hart Ely, among others. See
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (describing how judicial review defines
"the ultimate limits imposed on pluralist bargaining by the American constitutional
system"); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 659 (1979) (adopting an "interpretivist" view of judicial review put forth by Ely and
arguing that the judiciary supports a constitutional right to welfare through its review of
statutes). That is not to say that the theory is without its own problems. See, e.g., Paul
Brest, The Substance of Process,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 134-37 (1981) (arguing against Ely's
view that "courts are more competent to engage in representation-reinforcing judicial
review" as opposed to "fundamental values review"); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistenceof Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980)
(questioning the ability to ascertain which groups are prejudiced, a point central to Ely's
argument that "governmental action that burdens groups effectively excluded from the
political process is constitutionally suspect").
65 See Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1478-79, 1482, 1491. For other claims that third-party
effects may justify unsettling bargains over rights, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme
Court, 1987 Term - Forward: UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-28 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the
Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913,
916, 920 (2006); John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of
ConstitutionalDefault Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 829-30 (2006); Tamar Frankel,

What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations
Teaches Us About Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 703-13 (2006); Seth F.
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free transfers collectively result in unacceptable distributive consequences. 66 I
argue that all four defenses of the clear statement rule rest primarily on the first
and second of Sullivan's scenarios. Each assumes, either explicitly or
implicitly, that state decisions to accept grants produce serious third-party
harms that will not be taken into account by the bargaining parties because of
imperfections in the way in which public officials represent the public interest.
More specifically, defenders of the clear statement rule presume that state
decisions to accept federal funds will fail to account for the nationwide harms
to our system of federalism that putatively will flow from many such decisions.
Some defenders also claim that, as a result of political process failures, state
officials' decisions will fail to reflect some harms internal to the state.
Correcting for these externalities may justify judicial intervention.
Before I detail these arguments in more depth, note first that in order to
justify judicial intervention one would likely have to identify failures on both
the "supply" and "demand" sides of the grant. If federal officials perfectly
represent the nation as a whole, they will never offer grants to states where
those grants would reduce the national welfare. In the absence of any
externality, state officials' decisions to accept the proffered grants, similarly,
should always maximize the wellbeing of the nation's citizens. 67 If the
political process on either side is functioning properly, then welfare-reducing
grants will fail: either Congress will never offer them or states will never
accept them.
Thus, although the first set of defenders of the clear statement rule focus on
Congress's behavior in extending grants, these defenders in effect also
presume a defect in state process. The Supreme Court, following Professor
Tribe, has said it wants to assure the rules governing state behavior are crafted
in a place where the political safeguards of federalism can operate - that is, a
venue open to state lobbying efforts. 68 By limiting statutes affecting states to

Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 1293, 1378-93 (1984).

66See Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1496-99.
67See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 862-63 (suggesting that states
will readily accept federal grants where "Congress has made a correct estimate of the
nonfederal governments' opportunity costs of providing the requested services"); Somin,
Closing the Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 465.
68 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) ("[T]o give the state-displacing weight

of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for
lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests." (quoting LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988))); see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (describing how "the wisdom and the discretion of
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess
at elections" are controls on Congress's power over the states); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1175-76 (3d ed. 2000). Richard Stewart also

offered a similar argument, roughly contemporaneous with Tribe's account. See Stewart,
supra note 22, at 963. For other, later commentators agreeing with this approach, see supra
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their "clear" language, the Court suggests it will reduce the degree to which
judges alone can bind the states. 69 Even assuming this is an accurate
description of the judicial process, it leaves unresolved the demand-side of our
equation. The states may well lack power to control all the terms of the grants
offered to them. But that does not explain whether one should expect the states
to accept such grants where their nationwide or local expected value is
negative. In claiming that state control is the whole story, Professor Tribe and
the Court have simply assumed the states would accept pernicious grants.
There is a similar lacuna in the claims by a second group of scholars who
have argued the clear statement rule can be justified because, historically,
courts have inadequately defended federalism values, and Congress is unlikely
to give full consideration to the virtues of state power. 70 This "underenforced
norm" critique, too, seems to assume that states will not fully vindicate their
own rights.
A third set of commentators, including some who have urged the
underenforced norm view, have given more direct attention to the question of
state officials' behavior. One version of this argument suggests that state
officials may have incentives to set aside or discount the potential harms of
federal grants in favor of their own political interests. 71 The typical story here
note 27.

The political safeguards theory has proven highly controversial.

For more extensive

discussions on either side, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the
Double Standard of JudicialReview, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 107-12 (2001); Baker & Berman,
Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 475-77; Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political
Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1113, 1121-27 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278-87 (2000); McGinnis & Somin,

Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note 20, at 103-04; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C.
Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedFederalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1459, 1483-89 (2001); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543, 559-60 (1954).
69 See Gregory,501 U.S. at 464.
70 See authorities cited supra note 13.
71 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 22, at 1942, 1946 (hypothesizing that

legislators may seek to 'entice' outlier states into amending or adopting some provision(s)
of state constitutional or statutory law"); Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at
886-87 (stating that politicians may face different agency costs at the federal or state level
based on the strength of constituents); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124-25;
McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note 20, at 118; Somin, Closing
the Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 465-66 (explaining how state politicians may have
incentives to "yield to the preferences of national political majorities"); Stewart, supra note
22, at 958-59; see also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated

Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 797 (1995)
(describing how state officials can politically act in a self-interested manner); Levinson,
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is one of a political market failure, in which local officials distort the
preferences of their constituencies. The central claim is that officials will fully
value the proffered cash grant while discounting in their calculus the cost of
any attached conditions. 72 The cash the official has brought home to her
district is easy to measure and highly salient in the eyes of her voters, while the
costs of the accompanying strings may be hard to measure and may get buried
in the budgets of many different local entities. 73 The official also might
calculate that voters will have trouble associating these costs with the official's
74
decision to accept the grant.
These critics could raise a similar criticism based on the possibility of time
discounting, but thus far have not. An official offered the chance to accept a
grant today may well discount the true effect of future costs. 75 Grants allow
76
for immediate political rewards, but costs may not come until much later.
The official may irrationally discount future costs, or rationally calculate that
by the time angry voters notice the red ink, she will be safely retired or her
vote long forgotten. 77 At a minimum, the official has achieved some of her
policy goals in the time between the reward of the grant and the pain of the
supra note 19, at 941 (asserting that state officials may favor increased federal power if it
leads to more federal spending on states).
72 See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 886-87.

Professors McGinnis

and Somin also emphasize that the states discount the costs to themselves of the federal tax
dollars that pay for the grants they receive. See McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States'
Rights, supra note 20, at 118 (explaining the incentive for politicians to "acquire funds that
are mostly paid for by taxpayers in other states"). While I disagree with this account, for
my purposes here I accept it. In my analysis I assume that states treat the costs to
themselves of federal grants as essentially $0.
13 See Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1942-46 (discussing public choice

dynamics of grants); cf Hills, CooperativeFederalism, supra note 16, at 886-88 (describing
how Congress may require public participation in accepting federal grants because of the
view that "some constituents are over or underrepresented in the local political process").
14 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124 (stating that voters tend to view grants as
gifts without considering the attached strings); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 22, at 136061 (describing how in a nontransparent political system "people cannot assign blame for an
unpopular federal policy"); cf McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra

note 20, at 94-99 (describing sources of rational voter ignorance of federalism issues).
71 Cf Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public
Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 12-13 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod
eds., 2006) (describing the effect on public officials of "present-tense bias").
76 Cf Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
31 (1982) (suggesting that political "issues of immediate impact" will predominate over
issues "carr[ying] a long-term impact").
I 177See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future
Generations,2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 289, 294-301; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk,
"Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1039-41 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263,

.265-66 (1979).
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Even if the official genuinely wants to balance costs and benefits,
many costs can be purely subjective, making them difficult for the official
79
alone to measure.
Finally, there is a fourth strand of support for the clear statement rule that
seems to focus on both the supply and demand sides of the grant process. In
this view, which I have elsewhere termed "notice as deliberation," 80 the clear
statement rule activates citizens who otherwise would be inattentive to the
The notice-as-deliberation approach, like the
legislative process. 8 '
underenforced norms critique, begins with a public choice story about general
voter inattention. The theory here appears to be that, if not for the vagueness
of the terms attached to conditional federal grants, voters would be more
engaged in both federal and state legislative processes. 82 That engagement, in
turn, would make it more likely that offers and acceptances alike would
enhance national welfare, rather than heeding small groups of special interests.
In sum, all of the defenses of the clear statement rule depend on a common
premise, sometimes explicit and sometimes assumed, of failures in the state
political process. More specifically, they rely on the likelihood that, when
state officials elect to accept federal grants, they will discount to some degree
potential harms to their constituents or outsiders that arise from their decisions
to accept the grant. As I will argue, because states are usually free to make bad
policy for themselves, it is this latter externality - harms to outsiders - that is
of greatest concern to constitutional law. Meanwhile, the question remains the
broader one: do state officials maximize national welfare in their decisions to
accept funds?
Thus, the remainder of this Article attempts to shed more light on the
behavior of state officials. Despite the centrality of this question, scholars
have subjected it to little, if any, rigorous scrutiny. In the succeeding Parts, I
attempt to assemble the available social science evidence on whether voters
can rely upon state officials to preserve the values of federalism.
costs.

II.

DISCOUNTING, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND THE THEORY OF GRANTS

As Part I demonstrated, the question of how judges should interpret the
terms of federal grants turns on underlying questions about the performance of
78 See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined

Sales and Use Tax Agreement ("SSUTA '), 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1381, 1425 n.224 (2007)

[hereinafter Galle, SSUTA].
" See Aranson et al., supra note 76, at 38-39.
80Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 177-81.
1 Merrill, supra note 27, at 833; see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-39

(2007) (making this argument in the context of congressional decisions to preempt state
law); Sunstein, supra note 27, at 317, 335 (making this argument in the context of
delegations to agencies that would approach limits of federal power over states).
82 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 317.
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state officials.
If state officials internalize whatever social cost may
accompany a decision to accept a federal grant, the case for close judicial
oversight weakens. 83 This Part begins the analysis at the level of the general
theory of official behavior in response to grants. Is it true, as proponents of the
clear statement rule suggest, that state officials largely discount any negative
effects of the grants? The analysis that critics of conditional spending offer for
the political economy of state decisions to accept funds remains significantly
incomplete. Indeed, given the wide variety of different combinations of grants
and conditions, any broad generalizations about the politics behind them
probably cannot prove accurate in all cases.
A.

Public Choice Theory

The critical analysis, as outlined in the last Part, relies mainly on
straightforward public choice theory. 84 The small, heavily affected groups, the
argument goes, will be the potential recipients of federal grants, while the costs
of complying with the federal strings will be buried in the state's budget and
spread thinly among all taxpayers. 85 Even if no grantees have organized at the
time of an initial grant offer, over time, a constituency might develop that
depends on the grant revenues and form a powerful lobbying coalition to retain
them. 86 That scenario plausibly describes some federal programs, such as the

83For purposes of this Part, I accept for the sake of argument, the possibility that
externalities of any kind might justify federal judicial intervention. I will argue later that
courts should be concerned only with certain kinds of third-party effects - that is, that state
officials should be free to make bad decisions, except to the extent that their decisions
infringe on federally-protected values. See infra Part IV.A.
84 Rationally self-serving public officials, this claim goes, will tend to favor the interests
of their most intensely motivated group of constituents (or other interests involved in the
legislative process). See McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note 20,
at 103, 118. The effect is the result of collective action problems among constituents, many
of whom would prefer to free ride on the work of similarly situated others. Thus, the most
intensely active groups will be those that are small and have much at stake in the legislation.
For some basic summaries of public choice theory, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF

11-16, 21-22, 31, 35, 4648 (1965); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 19-62 (1992)
(outlining several economic tools that aid in the study of collective action problems).
85 Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 887 (arguing that well-organized
opposition could stop a cost-effective initiative that would benefit people with "muted
voices"); Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 465-66; Stewart, supra note
22, at 958.
86 See Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box, supra note 16, at 499; see also STEPHEN J.
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS

BAILEY,

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND

PRACTICE

97 (1999);

cf

Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 27879 (1990) (explaining how interest groups develop stakes in the legal status quo by favoring
the jurisdiction in which they are expert).
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IDEA, which offer specific entitlements to discretely identified groups (e.g., a
free and appropriate public education for children with disabilities), while
distributing the cost of the entitlement broadly across a wide swath of state
budget lines. 87 As a result, this theory predicts that state officials will accept
federal grants too readily, undercutting structural constitutional protections for
88
a diverse set of legal regimes.
However, one can just as easily think of any number of examples in which a
superficial public choice analysis cuts in the opposite direction. To return to
the IDEA example, the bureaucracy of each state agency is itself a
constituency of the legislature, and will likely resist threats to its budget indeed, that is the point of public choice theory.8 9 Thus, efforts to tap other
state budget items in order to pay for grant-compliance costs may stir up very
active resistance both from the ultimate beneficiaries of those budget items as
well as the government actors who administer them. 90 The critics' IDEA story
remains plausible where the resulting budgetary burden is spread evenly across
the entire state budget. In that scenario, the impact on the recipients of each
other state budget line may be small enough, and the number of the affected
large enough, that collective action problems will tend to mitigate political
opposition. In actuality, however, state-level IDEA expenses typically fall
rather heavily on a few budgets such as Departments of Education and other
state-level service providers obliged to provide services (such as transportation
for individuals with disabilities or residential care for the mentally ill) free of
charge. 91 Thus, a decision to accept a grant subject to the IDEA's restrictions
may well prompt a strong response from the affected agencies, as few others
will produce lobbying efforts upon which each agency could free ride.
Many other federal grant regimes look even less like the public choice
backdrop painted by critics. For instance, until 1975, Congress required states
to enact laws obliging motorcyclists to wear helmets as a condition of federal
highway funding. 92 Beginning in the early 1970's, however, a coalition of
For example, the IDEA appears to require contributions not only from state education
departments but also from other agencies that might provide services to the disabled
students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B) (2006).
87

88 Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1950; Hills, Cooperative Federalism,
supra note 16, at 887; Stewart, supra note 22, at 958, 971; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra

note 63, at 430-31 (arguing that conditional spending, like commandeering, essentially
obliges states to accept funds and attached conditions).
89

See Hills, CooperativeFederalism,supra note 16, at 887 (recognizing that "nonfederal

officials are themselves a powerful interest group with interests that can be inconsistent with
the well-being of their constituents").
11 Theory predicts that bureaucrats should prove highly effective in influencing
legislative decisions. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization,28 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 739, 769 (1984).
9" See § 1412(a)(12)(B).
92 Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966); 23 C.F.R. §

204.4 (1969).
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cyclists and motorcycle manufacturers banded together to undermine the
laws. 93 Although the cyclists did not succeed in convincing any state to refuse
federal funding, they went one better: they prodded many state officials into
joining their federal lobbying efforts, resulting in the ultimate repeal of the
helmet restriction. 94 Medical costs rose sharply afterwards and fell largely on
the general public. 95 This was the opposite of the story told by critics of
conditional spending. Here, a small, concentrated group shifted costs to the
public at large by resisting a conditional grant.
96
If that example proves unconvincing, consider the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
States accept funds subject to CAA conditions despite the large, concentrated
costs that the polluters in their jurisdiction bear as a result.97 Of course,
scholars sometimes hold up the environmental movement as a rare example of
public interest in small, diffuse costs occasionally triumphing over the
concentrated interests of polluters. 98 That triumph, though, only further
emphasizes the difficulty of forecasting matters of political economy.
B.

Things Get Sticky: Grant Theory

With that caution, again, about the dangers of generalization, there is also an
argument that under classic public finance theory almost every non-matching
conditional grant scenario should raise no public choice concerns. Because
money is fungible, even an earmarked federal grant should do no more than
slightly reduce the price for all of a state's expenditures, in effect redistributing the grant evenly to every beneficiary of state spending.9 9 For
93 See Clay P. Graham, Helmetless Motorcyclists - Easy Riders Facing HardFacts: The
Rise of the "MotorcycleHelmet Defense, "41 OHIO ST. L.J. 233, 238 (1980).
9' Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-280, § 208(a), 90 Stat. 454 (1976)
(codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 402(c) (2000)); Graham, supra note 93, at 238.
9 See Andreas Muller, Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Motorcycle Helmet Laws,
70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 586, 586 (1980).
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
91 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 597-98

(1996) (explaining that states accept environmental regulation despite concentrated costs to
particular industries and intangible benefits); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977) (explaining the improved position of
environmentalist groups when the federal government, rather than the states, sets policy).
98 See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalizationof
the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 85, 94-99, 110-12 (2001); Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV.
L. REv. 553, 564-65 (2001); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican
Moment - Explanationsfor Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.

29, 50-59 (1998).
99 David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, The Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New
Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions, 85 Q.J. ECON. 416, 420-23, 434 (1971)

(explaining how a lump sum distributed to a group may have diffuse economic benefit to all
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example, suppose a state chooses to spend $100 million of its $1 billion budget
on highways. The federal government gives the state $50 million earmarked
for highway spending. The state still prefers to tax its citizens and allocate its
resources in such a way that it spends $100 million on roads.' 00 The effect
should be that the state reduces its own spending on highways by $50 million
and either cuts taxes by $50 million, distributes the $50 million proportionately
among all its other spending priorities, or more likely, a mix of the two.101 If
this theory accurately represented how state governments behaved, then nearly
all non-matching' 0 2 conditional federal grants would have thin, widely-spread
benefits, but many of them would have narrow, heavy costs. Public choice
analysis predicts that in those situations states will simply refuse welfarediminishing grants because there is no disproportionately strong lobbying
group pressing for acceptance of the grant.
The catch here is that most empirical studies show that state and local
jurisdictions do not behave this way, at least not to the extent the classic theory
predicts. 10 3 Instead, targeted grants often increase recipient-jurisdiction
individuals through revenue sharing); David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, Towards a
Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 440, 443 (1971)
(suggesting that given certain conditions, a system that gave grants to individuals could
"lead[] via the political process to precisely the same equilibrium state of the community as
does the grant to the collectivity"); Ronald C. Fisher, Income and Grant Effects on Local
Expenditure: The Flypaper Effect and Other Difficulties, 12 J. URB. ECON. 324, 325-26
(1982). That is, the grant shifts the state's demand curve for government services outward
without changing its shape.
110See Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 218. To be completely accurate, the state
would likely make a small upward adjustment in highway spending as a result of the
additional wealth represented by the grant. But one would expect this additional spending
to be a fraction of the grant that resembles the percentage of the state's overall wealth
devoted to highway spending prior to the grant. If citizens spent $.01 per dollar of income
on highways, and the grant does not alter their preferences, they should spend $.01 of each
grant dollar on highways.
'0' Fisher, supra note 99, at 328; see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,
37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1129 (1999).
102 This analysis does not work perfectly for matching grants, which for obvious reasons
tend to encourage the state to spend more than it would otherwise prefer on the matched
expenditure. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 116-19 (2000); Stephen J.
Bailey & Stephen Connolly, The Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for FurtherResearch,
95 PUB. CHOICE 335, 336 (1998) ("[O]pen-ended matching grants have a greater stimulatory
effect on grantee spending than equivalent lump-sum grants because they have both income
and substitution effects.").
103 See Katherine Baicker, Government Decision-Making and the Incidence of Federal
Mandates, 82 J. PUB. ECON. 147, 177-78 (2001); Rebecca J. Campbell, Leviathan and Fiscal
Illusion in Local Government OverlappingJurisdictions, 120 PUB. CHOICE 301, 324 (2004);
Radu Filimon et al., Asymmetric Information and Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly
Power in Public Spending, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 51, 60-61 (1982); Nora Gordon, Do Federal
GrantsBoost School Spending? Evidence from Title 1, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1771, 1773 (2004);

2008]

FEDERAL GRANTS, STATE DECISIONS

spending in the targeted category, sometimes by nearly as much as the grant
amount. 10 4 For instance, in the highway example, the state might spend $130
million on roads after receiving the $50 million grant, and cut taxes or increase
other spending by only $20 million. Economists call this the "flypaper effect,"
10 5
because, as one economist colorfully put it, the money "sticks where it hits.
Importantly, recent studies suggest that flypaper effects tend to be short-lived,
such that grants increase targeted spending for a year or two, but states then
begin to decrease their own contribution and offset the grant with tax cuts and
spending increases in other areas, as theory predicts.' 0 6 Economists have
offered a variety of possible explanations for the flypaper phenomenon, but no
single theory has won out, and it seems possible that all of the hypothesized
processes contribute in some measure to the observed results. 107
The underlying causes of the flypaper effect may well be significant to the
public choice analysis. Some of the theories tend to support the conclusion
that state officials would undervalue the costs of accepting a grant or,
equivalently, overvalue the benefit of accepting. For example, one common
account claims that the flypaper effect results from officials' manipulation of
state spending in order to develop constituencies favorable to them, or from
whom they can extract rents.' 0 8 That is, officials take what would be an even
distribution of benefits and make it lumpy, precisely in order to generate extra
engagement from the community benefited. In that scenario, one might

Peter M. Mitias & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Grant Illusion, Tax Illusion, and Local
Government Spending, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 347, 361 (2001); Geoffrey K. Tumbull, The
Overspendingand FlypaperEffects of Fiscal Illusion: Theory and EmpiricalEvidence, 44 J.
URB. ECON. 1, 15-22 (1998); Byron F. Lutz, Taxation with Representation:
Intergovernmental Grants in a Plebiscite Democracy 24 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series,
Working Paper No. 2006-06, 2006), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs
/FEDS/2006/200606/200606pap.pdf. But see Brian Knight, Endogenous Federal Grants
and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal
Highway Aid Program, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 71, 88 (2002) ("[F]ederal highway grants crowd

out state highway spending, leading to little or no increase in net spending.").
104 Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 337-38, 339 tbl.1; G. Brennan & J.J. Pincus, A
Minimalist Model of Federal Grants and Flypaper Effects, 61 J. PUB. ECON. 229, 230
(1996); Fisher, supra note 99, at 329-30 & tbl.1; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 219-20;
Oates, supra note 101, at 1129; Monica Singhal, Special Interest Groups and the Allocation
of Public Funds, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 548, 554-56 (2008) (finding increases in state
expenditures on tobacco control programs despite large tobacco industry lobby); Volden,
supra note 61, at 225.
105 See supra note 29.
106

Gordon, supra note 103, at 1785-88; Lutz, supra note 103, at 19.
Bae & Richard C. Feiock, The Flypaper Effect Revisited:

107 See Sang-Seok

Intergovernmental Grants and Local Governance, 27 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 577, 583-85
(2004); Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 336, 347; Fisher, supra note 99, at 324;
Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 220-22.
108 See Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 581; Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 52.
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plausibly predict that the relevant officials see more political value in creating
a beholden set of grant recipients than the value of the grant warrants. Thus,
although the officials do not underestimate costs of compliance, they may
overvalue the gains of the grant. This prediction assumes, however, that the
officials with authority to accept conditional grants also have the authority to
allocate the resulting funds, or at least that they have a large degree of
influence over the allocating officials. That is not necessarily a good
assumption, particularly if budget-setting authority rests mainly with the
executive and acceptance rests with the legislature or vice versa. 0 9
A number of other theories of the flypaper effect might suggest little or no
additional political pressure to accept federal grants. One might, for instance,
question whether the rent-extraction theory can be squared with the categorical
stickiness of grants - that is, the fact that grant dollars are spent on the activity
they target. If politicians are developing or catering to interest groups, why do
politicians in many different states and local jurisdictions all happen to cater to
the same interest groups as those targeted by the federal grant? One
economist, Monica Singhal, theorizes instead that the flypaper effect is a form
of commission payment to groups that generated extra money for the state
through successful lobbying at the federal level. 110 In order to motivate these
groups to continue to exert effort in the future, state officials must offer them
some reward."' However, the group receives only a fraction of the value of
the grant, and the state offsets later payments as theory predicts. Although
Singhal does not consider our particular question, under this view, no evident
reason exists for state officials to either overvalue grant awards or undervalue
the cost of grant conditions.
In short, absent some new resolution of these disputes, it is unclear what
results public choice theory should predict for state decisions to accept
grants. 112 Grants from higher to lower tiers of government may or may not
result in widely shared benefits, confounding our ability to predict how
political actors will respond.

109Cf Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 584-85, 591 (arguing that the flypaper effect
may depend on the degree of accepters' control over the budget and finding a larger effect
where control of the budget and acceptance of the grant is integrated).
"i0Singhal, supra note 104, at 549.
d. at 551.
112 Later in this Article, I argue that the best explanation for the observed flypaper data is
Ill

a combination of official responses to incomplete voter understanding of fiscal information,
together with the need to appease grantors. See infra text accompanying notes 244-254.
This result, even if right, remains ambiguous as to the likely political economy results.
Officials who respond to voter ignorance may be acting either self-interestedly or in the
public welfare. Only the first set may reduce overall welfare by their choices, and available
data to date do not allow us to distinguish between the two.
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Discounting "Good" Grants

A final point of uncertainty about the public choice critique of federal grants
is that some grants may enhance national welfare. For example, grants and
their accompanying conditions may operate as tools of interstate coordination,
through which the federal government can encourage states to reduce negative
1 3
spillovers or increase their production of goods with positive externalities.
Just as local officials may neglect the negative nationwide effects of
accepting a grant, so too might they ignore the positive nationwide effects. By
definition, local voters do not take externalities into account in their
preferences. 1 4 Moreover, if the public choice/discounting story proves
persuasive, it should also persuade us about "good" grants. The increased
national welfare that follows from more efficient local behavior will benefit all
citizens roughly equally and will arise mostly at some future time. Again, the
public choice story predicts that the political process will generally neglect
these forms of goods.t 15
Thus, the discounting of both nationwide costs and benefits may put grants
in a kind of equipoise. The fact that grants might be too tempting, in some
sense, potentially can offset the fact that in another sense they are not tempting
enough. 1 6 Which effect predominates remains an empirical question that will
117
vary from grant to grant.
Accordingly, I am skeptical that public choice analysis offers any coherent
set of guidelines on which to base judicial intervention. Even instances in
which federal funds appear to flow narrowly and deeply to one interest group,
with costs spread thinly across a state's population, may prove relatively
innocuous on close inspection. Our political science simply is not good

113 Caminker, supra note 6, at 1012-13 (using the Radioactive Waste Act as an example

to discuss ways inwhich Congress can empower the states); Oates, supra note 101, at 1127;
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 113 (2004).

That is, rather than designing their own institutions for bargaining, writing their own sets of
rules for agenda setting and agreement, and consenting to a mutually satisfactory
enforcement system, states wishing to agree amongst themselves simply take their issues to
their congressmen. They can then write a proposed bill offering money in exchange for
compliance and rely on federal regulators and courts to oversee the whole exchange. See
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Introduction to ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM, at
xiv-xv (Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E.Ribstein eds., 2007); Somin, Closing the Pandora's
Box, supra note 16, at 469-70.
114 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 120-28 (2d ed. 2007).
"I See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 767-68
(2004).

116 1 am grateful to Rick Hills for suggesting a version of this point.
I" For purposes of this Article, though, I place relatively little weight on this possibility.
My focus here is on whether state officials, on their own, will reject welfare-diminishing
grants. I therefore presume, for the sake of argument, that essentially all federal grants are
at best welfare-neutral.
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8
enough to say for certain." 1

III.

A

SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX AS A CONSTRAINT ON DECISIONS TO ACCEPT

GRANTS
This Article has argued so far that the theoretical argument supporting the
assumption that state officials will discount the costs of grants remains
incomplete to the extent that it overlooks the possible implications of public
finance economists' theory of grants. Another major hole in the critics'
assumptions lies in the fact that they neglect not only a complete treatment of
grants but also any treatment of state and local taxation. To illustrate the size
of that hole, I offer a simple model of how local taxes could affect the
attractiveness of federal grants to local officials. In essence, one cannot make
meaningful predictions about the political economy of a local decision to
accept a grant by considering only the grant; a full analysis must include the
politics of the state's tax system as well.
The model proceeds from the intuition that officials will choose the least
politically costly alternative for obtaining a set benefit. Even if officials
discount the actual welfare cost to their constituents in determining whether to
accept grants, grants still have political costs. Depending on the degree of
discounting, it may prove politically cheaper for the official to substitute a
local tax increase for the federal grant. Put another way, officials should only
accept a conditional grant where the attached conditions are less odious than a
comparable tax increase would be. Thus, local political taste for increased
taxes may represent a kind of floor for the amount of perceived costs a locality
is willing to accept in exchange for federal funds.
A series of stylized graphs illustrate this point. 19 Figures I A and lB chart
the politician's perceived political cost of raising money, X, against Y, the
actual cost of accepting a federal grant (in Fig. IA) or raising taxes (in Fig.
1B).

"8 Cf Merrill, supra note 27, at 834 (arguing that the efficacy of political safeguards of

federalism is an elusive, empirical question).
119 For

a more mathematically rigorous model based on a similar premise, see Volden,

supra note 61, at 215-23.
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Figure 1A
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These figures represent the ideal case: both graphs show identical straight
lines, indicating that the politician fully internalizes the welfare effects either
of an unfortunate condition (Fig. IA) or imposing taxes (Fig. 1B). In other
words, in both Figures 1A and lB the politician is just as reluctant to force his
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constituents to suffer $100 in costs as the constituents would be themselves.12 0
In the world represented by Figure IA, all decisions to accept grants will
increase constituent welfare, because the politician will obviously reject grant
offers in amounts below the line and accept those above it. For instance, at
point P1, where the actual and perceived costs of a condition are both $100, a
grant amount would have to be $101 or more to convince the politician to
accept. 21 Tax is not a meaningful limit in Figure 1, since the political costs
either of taxing a certain amount or accepting a condition with a given cost are
always identical. Thus, at point P1, any offer that exceeds the costs of
accepting the grant condition could be matched only by a tax in which the
political cost of raising $101 will exceed the cost of accepting the grant.
There is a similar situation if, as critics of conditional spending seem largely
to assume, politicians discount the costs of accepting grants but not the costs of
raising taxes. 122 Figures 2A and 2B model these assumptions.

120 My results here do not depend on whether we conceive of costs to voters as average
costs, costs to the median voter, or overall social welfare adjusted by some distributional
preference.
121I assume for simplicity that the official fully realizes the political benefit of having
money to spend. Of course, exaggerated, discounted or diminishing political returns on
spending as well as on revenue-raising also seem possible. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (4th ed. 1984); Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and

Measurement of FiscalIllusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN

HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65, 67 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988) (raising the
possibility of exaggerated returns due to "a systematic misperception of fiscal parameters a recurring propensity, for example, to underestimate one's tax liability associated with
certain public programs"). I set aside those cases here.
122 I am not aware of any prior analysis in the legal literature of the possibility of localsource tax discounting.
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Figure 2A
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Figure 2A illustrates a world in which officials discount the costs to their
constituents of accepting a grant. At point P2 in this graph, the actual costs to
the official's constituents of accepting a federal grant are $100, but the official
perceives the costs only to be $50. At the same time, in Figure 2B, the
perceived political cost of raising $51 in taxes is $51. In this world, all grants
reduce constituent welfare, and taxes again are no constraint. At point P2, the
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official is willing to accept a grant of $51 with an actual cost of $100 because
the perceived political cost of accepting the grant is only $50, and the political
cost of substituting a tax would be $51.
Figure 3 is where things start to get interesting.

Figure 3
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In Figure 3, the political price of taxes, too, is discounted. Thus, at P3, the
political cost of raising $51 in funds from tax is approximately $40.80. In this
world, we should expect the official to refuse a $51 grant with a perceived cost
of $50, because she can get the same money, at lower political cost, simply by
raising taxes. This observation leads us to the inequality,
Dt * G > Dc * C
This inequality expresses the relationship between Figures 2A and 3. The
left side represents the official's discount rate for raising taxes (Dt) multiplied
by the grant amount (G). The right side represents the official's discount rate
for accepting grant conditions (Dc) multiplied by the cost of accepting the
grant (C). Put simply, the inequality indicates that we should expect a rational
official to accept a conditional federal grant only where the discounted political
costs of raising an equivalent amount of money through taxation would exceed
the discounted costs of accepting the grant. For example, at a grant amount of
$61.60, the perceived political costs either of accepting the grant or raising
taxes are equal. At any amount less than $61.60, the official rejects the grant.
At amounts in excess of $61.60, she accepts it. Assuming the conditions of the
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grant remain fixed, the official's opportunity to substitute taxes for the federal
grant increases the price of the grant.
A bit more elementary algebra shows us the broad implications of these
simple deductions. Solving the inequality for the term G, the grant amount,
yields a second relationship:
G > (Dc/Dt) * C
The term on the right represents the ratio of the official's discount rate for
accepting grant conditions over the discount rate for raising taxes. In this
model in which the rates are fixed and linear, the relationship between these
two discount rates tells us whether grant amounts must be greater or less than
the total cost of compliance. Wherever officials discount the costs of accepting
federal conditions by a greater percentage than they discount the cost of raising
taxes, then C, the cost to taxpayers, will be multiplied by a number less than
one (in my example, .5 / .8, or .625).123 That is, if officials discount the burden
of federal conditions more than they discount the burden of taxation, they will
accept grants that do not pay fully for the burden on their constituents. In this
1 24
scenario, constituent welfare decreases.
But - and this is the key point - there is another scenario, in which officials
discount the costs of raising taxes by a larger percentage than they discount the
costs of grant compliance. In those situations, C will be multiplied by a
number largerthan one, and the grant that the federal government would have
to offer a state to accept its conditions must actually exceed the costs of
acceptance.
In other words, even if local officials discount the costs to their constituents
of accepting federal conditions, the decision to accept the grant may still
increase constituent welfare. 125 If the cost of raising revenue from local taxes
is discounted even more than the cost of accepting federal conditions, then the
grant price demanded by the locality's officials may be larger than the actual
cost to their citizens of the conditions. Thus, the political optics of grant
conditions demonstrate only half the story; we also need to know how officials
123 That is, in the examples I have given, officials perceive only half of the costs of

federal grant conditions, but perceive 80% of the costs of raising taxes. So the discount on
grant conditions is larger, at 50%, as compared with 20% for the discount on tax increases.
124 Although net utility is negative in this example, note that the fact of tax discounting
alongside grant-cost discounting has reduced the amount of negative utility incurred by the
official's constituents. If own-sources taxes were not an available option, the utility loss
would have been the full discount rate, 50%, of the costs of complying with the grant
conditions. However, because of the tax consideration the loss is only 37.5%.
125Admittedly, however, the possibility of tax constraints on discounting may reduce
overall welfare in some situations. For example, I noted earlier that state officials may
discount positive as well as negative spillovers. If a given grant would generate a net
positive externality, then the opportunity for local revenue will induce officials to refuse the
grant, reducing welfare.
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view tax increases.
Two important objections to this line of thought spring immediately to
mind. First, given traditional taxpayer hostility to taxes, it may seem highly
unlikely that officials would discount the costs of raising money through
taxes. 26 Additionally, one might wonder why, if local officials actually could
generate further benefits for their constituents at a net gain in political capital,
they have not done so already. Arguably, the point at which local officials
stopped raising taxes by definition is the equilibrium point between taxing and
spending.
Our intuition about taxpayer hostility to tax increases is probably right for
the federal income tax, but perhaps rather less so when state and localities raise
revenue through their other potential avenues. For one thing, as I discuss later,
local jurisdictions may "export" their tax costs to outsiders. 127 For instance,
Alaska and Montana impose "extraction" taxes on their mineral resources,
which generally are shipped out of state. 128 These efforts are not always
successful. An extraction tax may in fact hurt state residents more than it
affects the out-of-state extractors, depending on whether the tax shifts mineral
production elsewhere or drives down the price that the state's producers
charge. 129 But measuring these complex chains of economic effects is at best
126See Edward J. McCaffery

& Jonathan Baron, Heuristicsand Biases in Thinking About

Tax, in NAT'L TAX Assoc., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION

434, 436 (2003) (measuring "tax aversion" - that is, a person's attitude toward calling
something a "tax").
127 Cf Gilbert E. Metcalf, Deductibility and Optimal State and Local FiscalPolicy, 39
ECON. LETrERS 217, 221 (1992) (suggesting that opportunities for tax exporting may have
made retaining sales tax cheaper than other alternatives); Stephen H. Pollock, Mechanisms
for Exporting the State Sales Tax Burden in the Absence of FederalDeductibility, 44 NAT'L
TAX J. 297, 299 (1991) (stating that the increase in state reliance on sales tax may be
explained by the fact that "[tihe state sales tax is subject to a significant amount of
exporting"). On the concept of tax exporting generally, see Robert Tannenwald, Fiscal
DisparityAmong the States Revisited, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 3, 4; infra
text accompanying notes 166-173.
128 See Tannenwald, supra note 127, at 7.
129 Charles E. McClure, Jr., Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in FISCAL
FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 169, 171-83 (Charles E. McLure,

Jr. & Peter Mieszkowski eds., 1983) [hereinafter McClure, Tax Exporting] (explaining, in a
classic analysis, that the likely outcome of a tax levied on natural resources by a producing
state will depend on "the conditions under which it is levied," including "the degree of
geographic concentration and the mobility of resources or industry, cartelization by taxing
states, international competition or price umbrella effects, natural substitutability,
government regulation, the prevalence of long-term contracts, the importance of
transportation costs and the way in which such costs are determined, unionization, and
market structure"); see also Charles E. McClure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme
Court: An Examination of FourCasesfrom the 1980 Term, 1 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 87-89
(1982) (concluding that coal sold under existing contracts would probably export the
severance tax to non-resident consumers, but that this would not be the case for those sold
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challenging.13
The actual effectiveness of tax exporting probably does not matter for our
purposes. The point is that it may appear to any but the most expert analyst
that the state successfully exports its tax burden. 13 1 If voters believe that
someone else is paying for a tax, it seems likely they will be less hostile to it.
Thus, as Daniel Shaviro has argued, states may tend to favor taxes that look as
though they are exported even if they are not.132 Tax scholars offer a similar
argument for the persistence of the corporate income tax: since no one really
knows who bears the "incidence," or economic burden, of the corporate tax,
133
individual voters tend to prefer it to other options.
The political science and psychological literatures suggest other ways in
which "hidden" taxes may reduce voter ire. For instance, voters tend not to
notice the full impact of small fees and sales taxes on their financial situation,
because these taxes arrive bit by bit, and often hidden inside other prices
(quick: how much of the price of your gallon of gas is tax?). 134 Voters also
tend not to take the time or mental effort to add up these costs, even if they
notice them. 135 Thus, there is strong evidence that political opposition to
"hidden" taxes of these forms is rather low compared to, for example, the
individual income tax. 136 Of course, it is possible that both hidden and more
salient taxes still generate exaggerated voter ire, rather than being
"discounted." But we at least have a plausible story for how local officials can
create discounts by their choice of tax instruments.
Let us turn back then to the second objection: the "equilibrium" argument.
Again, the claim is that we might be able to presume that local officials, prior
to the offer of a federal grant, have already imposed all the taxes they believe
they can without incurring more political loss than gain. Assuming that fiscal
under contracts negotiated after the passage of the tax); cf Pollock, supra note 127, at 300
(commenting that states are constrained in their use of exporting by the danger that such use
may drive up costs of doing business, which may in turn reduce investment and jobs).
130 McClure, Tax Exporting,supra note 129, at 169-70, 186-87.
See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and PoliticalLook at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 895, 956 (1992) [hereinafter Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation] (explaining
131

that a severance tax may be directly borne by out-of-state consumers, but its real economic
burden, even in the short term, cannot be determined without analyzing a multitude of
factors).
Id. at 957.
133 See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local Reliance on the Retail Sales
Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or DiscardIt?, 2000 BYU L. REV. 77, 91-92.
04 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE
POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 129 (1977); Campbell, supra note 103, at 305-06.
135 Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price
Presentation, 10 INT'L TAx & PUB. FIN. 189, 190-95 (2003); Edward J. McCaffery &
Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: DisaggregationBias in the Evaluation of Tax
Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 231-32 (2003).
136 Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 135, at 192.
132
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benefits are not discounted, the implication is that we have reached a point on
the tax curve at which additional taxes will no longer be at a discount.
There are a number of ways in which the equilibrium can change. Local
economic conditions can change, or new tax "instruments" can develop to
permit less objectionable tax increases. 137 The lobbying efforts that produce a
political impetus for the federal grant project might also change local taxpayer
preferences, increasing the returns to officials for enacting the policy with local
funds. 138 Some evidence suggests that taxpayers evaluate their tax situation
relative to those of their neighbors, such that tax increases nearby make local
139
tax increases more politically palatable.
The most convincing response, however, is probably that there often is no
stable tax/benefit equilibrium. 140 As observed by the economist Kenneth
Arrow, voter preferences are not perfectly linear. 14 1 Social choice theory
elaborates that an individual may prefer A to B and B to C, yet also prefer C to
A. 142 Thus, which outcome an individual settles on may depend on how he
frames the alternatives and the order in which he considers them. 143 In actual
That is, choices about how to structure a tax, and how to allocate its economic burden
on various individuals and activities, might change public preferences for more or less tax.
137

See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice And Public Interest: A Study Of The
Legislative Process As IllustratedBy Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53,
57-63 (1990). For instance, one might think that a tax on an activity that is unlikely to
change in response to taxation will reduce the amount of economic distortion that
accompanies the tax, so although the total tax might remain the same, the societal costs of
taxing decrease.
138Cf Singhal, supra note 104, at 560 (emphasizing the possibility that lawsuits brought
by interest groups may have a public-educative function that changes popular preferences
for services related to the lawsuit).
139 See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting,

and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 30 (1995).
140 See John E. Roemer, Distributionand Politics:A Brief History and Prospect,25 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 507, 510-13, 523-24 (2005).
141 KENNETH

J. ARROw,

SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

97-100 (2d ed. 1963)

(proving that the no social welfare function can satisfy all four conditions of social choice
theory); see also

AMARTYA

K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 35-51

(1970). For cogent explanations of Arrow's theorem in laymen's terms, see KENNETH A.
SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND
INSTITUTIONS 63-81 (1997); Hebert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 293, 318-28 (1992).
142 See Bernard Grofman, Some Notes on Voting Schemes and the Will of the Majority, 7
PUB. CHOICE 65, 75 n.4 (1969); Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivitiesin Multidimensional
Voting Models and Some Implicationsfor Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472
(1976) ("[I]t is theoretically possible to design voting procedures which, starting from any

given point, will end up at any other point in the space of alternatives .... "); Steven
Slutsky, Equilibrium Under a-Majority Voting, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1113, 1119 (1979).
143 See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259,
260 (1999); McKelvey, supra note 142, at 480-81.
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studies of legislative behavior, officials who initially chose A over B would
144
sometimes switch to B upon the introduction of a third policy option, C.
Accordingly, the fact that a local legislature settled on a particular package of
taxes and benefits is not necessarily evidence that voters would be unwilling to
45
accept more taxes in exchange for more benefits. 1
In sum, my main point in this Part is that predicting the welfare effects of
state decisions to accept conditional grants is much more complicated than the
existing literature would suggest. It is not enough to forecast whether state
officials will discount the costs of accepting grants. To make good predictions,
we also have to forecast the relative discount rates of both the costs of
146
accepting grants and the cost of raising taxes from local sources.
IV.

OTHER SECOND-BEST INTERNALIZATION STORIES

To this point I have attempted to show that it is uncertain whether officials
offered federal grants will act as good agents for the electorate and make
decisions that maximize welfare. Notwithstanding these arguments, in this
Part, I assume that officials act as poor agents. Even under that assumption, it
remains possible that the personal motivations that drive officials, aside from
the kinds of reelection-related motives canvassed in the earlier discussion of
public choice theory, will produce outcomes quite similar to those that would
result if there were perfect agency. In this Part, I consider whether the selfinterest motivations of politicians may themselves preserve federalism values
well enough to make judicial intervention unnecessary.
A.

Which Costs Matter?

It obviously would be absurd to argue that state officials will, by chance,
always have self-interested motivations that align their decisions with the
interests of their constituents. Federal grants cover the waterfront of policy
questions, and the decision to accept a grant therefore may have a variety of
subjectively negative effects. Mandatory motorcycle helmet laws may reduce

144See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 214-32 (1982).

141See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, " Not an "It": Legislative Intent as

Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 241-42 (1992). Relatedly, positive political
theory suggests that the end results of legislative processes may be produced more by the
structure of the decision-making process than the underlying preferences of voters and
legislators. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7-8 (1994).

146Of course, it is possible that there are easy short-cuts for estimating state officials'
attitudes towards tax increases. For instance, if a state's electorate had a strong preference
for increased spending that persisted over time, but the state nonetheless did not raise taxes,
that might suggest the perceived political costs of tax increases were quite large. There is an
argument that the "flypaper effect" I described earlier could be evidence of just such a tax
shortfall. See infra Part V.
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the welfare of those who enjoy both risk and the feeling of wind in their hair.
But, the effect of interest groups aside, it is not clear why a self-interested state
official would oppose such laws.
Accordingly, the claim here is rather narrow. I argue that only certain thirdparty effects should concern federal courts. Some prominent critics of
conditional spending, including Professor Baker, have at times argued that
1 47
conditional spending is unconstitutional because it reduces overall welfare.
These general claims about voter welfare prove far too much. By themselves,
they offer no account of why state legislative decisions, even those that may
reduce statewide welfare, are grounds for federal judicial intervention. States
make bad decisions all the time, and so, of course, do Congress and other
federal political actors. But basic tenets of modem constitutional law reject as
illegitimate and impractical such an expansive role for courts in setting aside
the reasonable decisions of fairly-constituted legislatures. 48 While there is
surely a place for welfare maximization, that principle must be cabined by
some federal interest derived from the Constitution or a federal statute that
justifies federal judicial intervention.
Probably the most prominent candidate for a federal interest underlying149the
I
Arlington rule is the diversity values of a federalist system of government.
A
hallmark
of
federal
do not claim this as an original insight on my part.
legislation is that it often displaces or prevents a diverse set of state or locallevel rules. 150 One of federalism's central goals - and in the views of some

147

Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1950-53, 1972-73; Baker & Berman,

Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 474.
148E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND

DISTRUST

73-183 (1980) (setting out, and

justifying as consistent with existing doctrine, the author's theory that the U.S. Supreme
Court's role is primarily to protect fair democratic processes, not to impose what it
perceives as best policy results). For an example of how expansive the welfaremaximization theory could reach, consider that an anonymous Note author in the Harvard
Law Review applies much the same analysis in effect to condemn generally any federal
legislation crafted during a period in which the same political party controls both the White
House and Congress. Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REv. 885, 900-01 (2006) [hereinafter Note, No Child Left
Behind].
"' See Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1948; Baker & Berman, Getting

Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 470 (stating that the judicial enforcement of states' rights
serves the function of protecting states "from federal homogenization in areas in which they

deviate from the national norm," which increases and preserves "diversity among the
states"); Engdahl, supra note 4, at 85; Neil S. Siegel, Commandeeringand its Alternatives:
A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1629, 1651 (2006); Somin, Closing the
Pandora'sBox, supra note 16, at 464; Stewart, supra note 22, at 919-20.
150 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 60-61, 64-65 (1998) (explaining that the states can serve as experimental

laboratories and thus the Supreme Court should limit the federal government's ability to
uniformly deny recognition of a right on a national level "before there has been a substantial
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skeptics, such as Professors Rubin and Feely,' 51 its only goal - is exactly to
preserve that diversity. 152 Diversity produces many good ends such as
opportunities for citizens to maximize their own happiness by locating in a
jurisdiction with a congenial set of rules, chances to experiment with different
solutions to similar problems, and competitive pressures on local governments
to adopt the most appealing of these solutions. 53 In addition, state freedom to
diverge from federal rules may serve as a constraint on federal lawmaking by
between state and federal government
offering a sort of "vertical" competition
54
governance.1
effective
most
the
for
Accordingly, I do not endeavor to show here that state officials always
improve national welfare, but only that they tend to protect state policy
diversity. I accept the claim that diversity is a constitutionally-grounded good
whose protection may well be a federal judicial obligation. In the remainder of
this Part, I consider whether conditional spending poses any threat to that
good.' 5 5 In particular, I claim that state officials' decisions to accept
conditional funds likely approximate the decisions such officials would reach
if they were perfect agents of their constituents.
One difficulty for this discussion, which I want to acknowledge at the
outset, is the uncertainty in how officials would behave if they were perfect
agents. Decentralized decision-making is not an unmitigated good; the study
of public finance is in many ways an effort to identify those instances in which

period for experimentation").
151Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National

Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 914-26 (1994) (arguing that "federalism allows the states
to vary as they choose, pursuing their own policies instead of the national one," and thus
"can be justified only by arguments favoring a variety of policies, not by arguments
favoring the implementation of a single policy by a variety of methods").
152 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The PoliticalEconomy of Federalism, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83-85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); McGinnis &
Somin, Federalismvs. States'Rights, supra note 20, at 106.
153For a sampling of the many interesting discussions on these points see, for example,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION

173-86 (1980); BREYER, supra note 27, at 56-65; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-1500 (1987); Kobayashi &
Ribstein, supra note 113, at xii-xiv; Oates, supra note 101, at 1122-23; Stewart, supra note
22, at 918.
'5'See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process:

The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 380-95; Stewart,
supra note 22, at 918.
151My arguments here also tend to demonstrate that conditional spending on average is
welfare enhancing overall. However, my argument does not rest on that point because, as I
contend in the main text, determining the net welfare effect of a policy is the province
mainly of legislatures, not federal courts.
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centralized government is superior to local and vice-versa. 56 Therefore, what
I can show, at best, is that state officials will often have incentives of their own
to take heed of the centralizing effects of federal grants. I cannot show that
these incentives produce the socially optimal level of decentralized
government, because the socially optimal level is unknown. My claim is
simply that the divergence between the unknown optimal and some concern for
decentralization is likely smaller than the gap between optimal and zero, which
is the amount of concern critics seem to assume. In this respect, my argument
is quite similar to the political theory of the Dormant Commerce Clause, which
posits that, while it is impossible for courts to specify just how much weight
states should give to the effects of their actions on outsiders, the fact of some
in-state surrogate for outside interests is sufficient to ward off judicial
57
intervention.1
B.

Official Incentives to Produce Diversity

Critics of conditional spending overlook significant incentives for state
officials to actually over-produce decentralization and policy diversity. To
some extent these points are familiar, especially to those who study state and
local taxation, although they have not yet found their way into the debate over
conditional spending.
First, there are a set of what we might call "race to the top" incentives for
state officials that would tend to weigh against a decision to opt into a set of
uniform federal rules. Local jurisdictions compete against one another for
mobile capital and productive citizens. 158 An official who succeeds in that
competition, at least relative to the yardsticks her constituents use for
comparison, 159 will likely reap political gains. 160 These newcomers can offer
156 See generally Oates, supra note 101.
157 See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 131, at 931-34; Mark Tushnet,
Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 130-33.
' See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURISDICTIONAL
TAX AND POLICY COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM? 60-63 (1991);
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES, at ix (2001) (stating

that the homeowner voters' stake in local politics which makes them attentive to public
policy may explain local governments' race to the top in public education and
environmental protection); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property &
Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 103 (2005).
159 In a relatively unregulated system of interjurisdictional competition, citizens lack
information on which to compare the performance of their public officials. Some empirical
research suggests that voters may make up for this gap by using heuristics, or mental shortcuts, such as rough comparisons between their own officials and those in other nearby
jurisdictions, or perhaps between local and federal officials from their own jurisdiction.

Besley & Case, supra note 139, at 29-3 1. Thus, a candidate's success in keeping taxes low
may be judged, not in absolute terms, but in comparison to trends in tax rates in neighboring
jurisdictions. Id.
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additional tax revenues, added jobs, higher home values, and perhaps, aside
from their revenue effects, lead to better schools and safer streets.' 6' At a
minimum, the ability to attract outsiders perceived as valuable sends a positive
signal to existing voters about the quality of their local government, and the
reverse is almost certainly true. 162 Thus, entrepreneurial officials should want
to develop innovative new projects or new technologies, or methods for
163
delivering old ones that offer a comparative advantage over their neighbors.
On the other hand, as Susan Rose-Ackerman and others have pointed out, if
innovations are easy to copy, then perhaps there is a free-rider problem, and
officials will not see enough reward in being the first politician to motivate
much innovation. 164 While the question is complex, overall it is likely there is
at least some motivation for local actors to innovate, albeit at below socially
165
optimal levels.
Other aspects of state competition are less conducive to the national welfare
but equally effective at making local officials disinclined to accept conditional
federal grants that would reduce diversity and state autonomy. For example,
160 See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-18 (1995) (stating that local
governments must provide public services that meet local businesses' and residents' needs
to keep the citizens in-state because marginal businesses and marginal residents determine
the market value of property in the locality); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery,
The New Economics ofJurisdictionalCompetition: Devolutionary Federalism in a SecondBest World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 207-09 (1997) (stating that under Tiebout's model, a rational
individual will choose a jurisdiction based on its taxes and available public goods);
McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note 20, at 109 (arguing that there
is an incentive to compete because if state governments can increase their tax base, they can
use the increase in tax revenue to fund popular programs and gain the support of powerful
interest groups).
161See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participationin the Production
of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 88 (2001); McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs.
States'Rights, supra note 20, at 109.
162 See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 153, at 178; cf Mancur Olson, Dictatorship,
Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 567 (1993), reprinted in READINGS IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 130, 139 (Kaushik Basu ed., 2003).
163 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 160, at 207-09.
164 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594-95 (1980); David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as
a Networked Order: The InternationalSystem as an Informational Network, 598 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 52, 55, 60 (2005); Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government
DecentralizationIncrease Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208 (2002);
Lars P. Feld et al., Federalism, Decentralization, and Economic Growth 10 (Marburg
Working Paper on Econ., No. 30/2004, 2004), available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02
/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2004-30-FederalismGrowthDPgesamt.pdf.
165 Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments 81-82 (Aug. 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=l198835 (exploring whether states have an incentive to innovate
despite the threat of free-riding).
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scholars of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence often
describe states as eager to "export" their own costs to those who reside outside
the state.' 66 A classic example is Delaware's hefty tolls at the Delaware
Memorial Bridge which represent a substantial portion of Delaware's budget.
Out-of-state travelers who drive the fifteen-mile stretch of 1-95 that passes
through Delaware largely bear the costs of the toll.' 67 Uniform sets of federal
rules tend to greatly reduce state opportunities for cost exporting. 168 The
Constitution will usually prohibit outright discrimination, at least absent
congressional authorization. 69 Accordingly, states must craft legal rules that
are facially neutral, but as a result of some distinctive feature of the state,
produce disproportionate benefits for themselves. That will typically be
difficult if the state agrees to accept a single nationwide rule or set of rules.
This foregone opportunity to discriminate is not only economically costly to
the state but also politically costly to state officials. Again, there is a strong
public choice component to state officials' preference for diverse sets of rules
that permit them to attempt to export costs. Out-of-state individuals certainly
can participate in the political process of a state that exports its costs on them,
albeit not generally with a simple vote.'7 0 They can lobby, contribute money
to well-disposed officials, organize any in-state interests that might be
sympathetic, buy advertising against the undesired position, and so on. 171 In

166 See Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurterand the Position of the
Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 228-33 (1957); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv.
1091, 1191 (1986); Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 131, at 910-12.
167 See DEL. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DELAWARE TRANSPORTATION FACTS 2006, at 60-61

(2006), http://www.deldot.gov/information/pubs_forms/fact book/pdf/2006/2006_deldot_
fact-book.pdf?22608; Federation of Tax Administrators, 2005 State Tax Collection by
Source, http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/05taxdis.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2008)
(sourcing 43.9% of Delaware's collected taxes as coming from sources other than the
individual income tax, corporate income tax and excise tax). For more detailed Delaware
fiscal data, see State of Delaware, Government Information Center, Chapter 7: State
Finance, http://gic.delaware.gov/lwv/body/dgbody-09.shtml (last visited Aug. 13, 2008).
168 See Galle, SSUTA, supra note 78, at 1399-1400.
169

See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576

(1997) ("We have 'consistently ... held that the Commerce Clause... precludes a state
from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom."' (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338
(1982))); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994) (finding a program
unconstitutional "that simultaneously burdens interstate commerce and discriminates in
favor of local producers"); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331
(1977) (discussing a tax where "[tihe obvious effect... [was] to extend a financial
advantage to sales on the New York exchanges at the expense of the regional exchanges").
170 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232 (5th ed. 2005).
171 Id.
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addition, in some cases, the possibility that a heavily burdened outsider might
relocate into the exporting state and consume resources there might force the
state to consider the impact of its policies on the outsider. 72 In many
instances, however, it will be difficult for burdened out-of-state interests to
organize as an effective political force because the interests are widely
scattered, reside or do business primarily in many different places, and
73
individually suffer only modest harms. 1
Even well-organized groups of outsiders may face the problem that they do
business in or travel to hundreds or thousands of jurisdictions, meaning that
they would have to carry out hundreds or thousands of ongoing monitoring,
organizing, and lobbying efforts. 174 This is precisely the dynamic that has led
to more than 7,000 different sets of state and local sales tax regimes in the
United States, notwithstanding the efforts of powerful nationwide retailers to
curtail the ever-expanding diversification.1 75
Scholars of the dormant
Commerce Clause often point to these forms of political market failure - that
is, the over-production of state diversity - in justifying their calls for more
stringent judicial oversight of state regulations affecting interstate
commerce.176
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 illustrates some other political costs of
capitulating to federal offers. 177 Among its many other provisions, the 1986
Act eliminated a section of the Tax Code allowing taxpayers to deduct on their
federal income tax return any state or local sales tax they had paid in a given

See CHOPER, supra note 68, at 190-93.
173 See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 131, at 931-32; Tushnet, supra note

172

157, at 130-33.
174 A typical solution for the out-of-state interest in this situation is to seek national
legislation preempting the state and local rules. See Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference
to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice
Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271-73 (1990); Revesz, supra note 98, at
564. The fierceness of many of these preemption battles, I believe, nicely demonstrates the

scale of what local jurisdictions perceive to be at stake in their opportunity to set their own
rules. It follows that the price for accepting uniformity as a condition of a federal grant may

be quite high.
175 Galle, SSUTA, supra note 78, at 1394-1400.
176 See Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the

Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1764, 1767-68 (2004); Dan T. Coenen,
Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 984-97 (1998);
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the Statesfrom Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraintson State
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377, 442-43, 453-58 (1996); Maxwell L.
Steams, A Beautiful Mend: A Game TheoreticalAnalysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 154-55 (2003).
177 For more detailed discussion of the political and economic aspects of the 1986
reform, see W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 124-

50 (1996); Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 589, 589-99 (1997).
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tax year. 178 State and local income and property taxes remained deductible. 179
180
In theory, deductibility should act almost exactly like a matching grant.
Local jurisdictions should shift their taxes to the forms that are deductible
because the after-federal-tax price of raising money through deductible taxes is
cheaper. As a result, local jurisdictions can raise more money through those
measures. 181 Thus, the effect of the 1986 Act should have been that states
would have a choice of either cutting taxes or shifting away from sales taxes.
If anything, though, states increased their reliance on sales taxes after 1986,
with no discernible pattern of changes in revenue levels. 182 Needless to say,
fiscal policy is highly complex, and there are probably many contributing
causes for the shift to sales taxes. Still, in essence, Congress offered the states
183
a massive payment to switch away from sales taxes, and the states refused.
As we have seen, one likely contributing cause was that states perceived an
opportunity to export tax costs through sales taxes, a mechanism that is not
84
easily duplicated with taxes on income or real property. 1
178Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2116
(1986). Congress has since repealed this provision and taxpayers can now choose between a
deduction of state and local sales tax or state and local income tax. American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-357, §501(a), 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
1 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2006).
181 See Charles E. McClure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Treasury land the Tax Reform Act
of 1986: The Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1 ECON. PERSP. 37, 55 (1987).
181 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS

65 (1984); Bruce Bartlett, The Case for
Eliminating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 28 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122-23 (1985)
("[D]eductibility of state and local taxes has been estimated to increase total state and local
government spending by as much as 20.5 percent .. "); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey
Rosen, FederalDeductibility and Local Property Tax Rates, 27 J. URB. ECON. 269, 270-71,
289, 291 (1990).
182 Paul N. Courant & Edward M. Gramlich, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
on State and Local Behavior, in Do TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986, at 243, 244-63 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting,
FederalDeductibility, and State Tax Structure, 12 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109, 111
(1993); Pollock, supra note 127, at 298.
183 Professor Pollock estimates that, as a result of the mechanics of deductibility, salestax deductibility resulted in about a six percent savings to states prior to 1986. Pollock,
supra note 127, at 298. He deems this a small amount, although for many states it amounted
to halfa billion dollars or more peryear. Id.
Contrary to some suggestions, it is not uncommon for states to refuse conditional federal
grants. For example, many states initially refused Aid to Families with Dependent Children
grants. Volden, supra note 61, at 227. Others refused Clinton-era grants to pay for local
teachers and police officers. Id.
184 See Pollock, supra note 127, at 299. On the relative difficulty of tax exporting with
income taxes, see supra text accompanying notes 166-169.
The economics literature includes two other hypotheses for the unexpected adherence to
sales taxes in the wake of the 1986 Act. As Gilbert Metcalf points out, less-than-full
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY
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The political economy of taxation, however, offers an equally plausible
explanation for state responses to the 1986 Act. Abandoning sales taxes would
have meant abandoning a system of potentially infinite variety, with
corresponding impacts on varying consumers and producers. Keeping the
sales tax in place offered officials the opportunity to demand rents from
various groups either to forebear from taxation or to continue taxation on
others. 185 One can generalize this lesson: anytime state officials credibly bind
themselves to a unified system, they will lessen opportunities to extract rents
from constituents - that is, they can demand less in exchange for a promise not
to enact or change a rule. 186 And state officials must share any credit for good
outcomes that result (for example, from the macroeconomic effects of wise
taxation) with officials from the federal government and other states involved
in the nationwide bargain. 187 Therefore, local officials have strong political
incentives to maintain distinctive and diverse sets of rules.
One could argue, however, that state fondness for sales taxes rests most
heavily on the simple fact that they are difficult for taxpayers to notice. Few
taxpayers tally their yearly sales tax bills. Income and property taxes almost
certainly have more "salience" for the average taxpayer - they are easier to
188
know and more prominent in the taxpayer's mind when she goes to vote.
Experimental work in taxpayer psychology supports this intuition: individuals
are willing to pay more tax if the tax comes in small, bite-sized pieces. 189
Thus, while income and property taxes may have been cheaper as a matter of
fiscal reality, as a matter of voter perception - and therefore of officials'
preferences - sales taxes looked cheaper. 90 This illustrates that states may

deductibility of sales taxes prior to 1986, together with the lower tax benefit of deductibility

that came with 1986's lower federal tax brackets, may have compounded the allure of the
opportunity to keep sales taxes as a tool for exporting taxes onto other jurisdictions.
Metcalf, supra note 127, at 220-21. Howard Chemick also suggests that states may have
adjusted their mix of sales and other taxes in order to restore a desired level of progressivity
following the changes of the 1986 Act. Howard Chernick, A Model of the Distributional
Incidence of State and Local Taxes, 20 PUB. FIN. Q. 572, 572-75 (1992).
185 Cf FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND

26-29 (1997) (claiming that public officials enact regulatory regimes
in order to demand rents from private parties for granting exemptions or forbearing from
POLITICAL EXTORTION

further regulation); id. at 124-31 (applying rent extraction theory to taxes and user fees).
186 Cf Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REv. 567, 572-776, 586-91

(1996) (arguing that Congress can extract greater rents where it can offer interest groups
assurances that it will be able to fulfill their demands in the future).
187

See Volden, supra note 61, at 219 (claiming that state governments likely prefer not

to share credit for successful programs with the federal government).
188 See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND.

L. REv. 1653, 1662-63 (1998); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking

About Tax, 12 PYSCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 106, 119-20 (2006).
189 See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 135, at 193-94.
190 The 1986 Act may have in fact accelerated the move to sales taxes by decreasing their
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well turn down grants, as they turned down the implicit matching grant offered
in the 1986 Act, where the political cost of substituting their own tax revenue
is lower.
To sum up, public choice analysis indeed predicts, as critics of conditional
spending maintain and as Justice O'Connor claimed in New York v. United
States, that state officials may not fully take into account the national interest
in federalism when considering offers from Congress. 191 However, a more
complete survey of the political factors at work suggests that the question is
complicated.
There are significant reasons to doubt whether Justice
O'Connor's generalization about the breadth and depth of the benefits and
burdens of grants is correct. Perhaps more significantly, state officials have
very powerful incentives to resist uniformity, even against the temptation of
funds they need not impose taxes to obtain. While I know of no good metric
for determining how much a state official "discounts" the federalism costs of
accepting a grant, it would be very surprising if diversity is not prized by those
officials at least as highly as the welfare benefits it creates.
Finally, I freely acknowledge the limitations of my analysis on this front.
For the most part my discussion here has assumed that, in keeping with the
bulk of the public choice literature, officials maximize their own welfare, or at
best, their opportunities for enacting their own set of ideological
preferences. 192 However, individuals may also be motivated by beliefs about
the norms and obligations of their role in society. 193 Norms, in turn, may be
sensitive to the institutional structure in which officials must operate. 194 Thus,
institutions that carry on interstate agreements should reflect in part our hopes
for developing norms consistent with the mission of the agreement. 195 I
therefore am open to the argument that the real debate in conditional spending
should be over how to design government in a way to mitigate the temptations
of state officials to sell out their constituents rather than whether state officials
salience. Taxpayers who deducted their sales taxes presumably had to tally them, thereby
realizing the full extent of the burden they were bearing each year.
"I' New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1991) ("The interests of public
officials... may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of
authority."); Somin, False Dawn, supra note 7, at 137-38 (recognizing that "state politicians
often have incentives to undermine federalism rather than promote it").
192 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 134-36, 167-70 (1965);
Aranson et al., supra note 76, at 38, 47-48.
'9' See STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 244-45 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1987)
(recognizing that people may "reserve certain decisions to self-interest and others to
altruism"); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 767 (2001);
Mark Tushnet, Non-JudicialReview, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453, 455 (2003).
194 See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 130-31 (1989);

Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-86 (1998);

Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 355-66 (1997).
195 I have argued this point elsewhere. Galle, SSUTA, supra note 78, at 1433-34.
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suffer such temptations.
That conclusion leads to a larger point about the clear statement rule
generally. The diversity values of federalism do not support the outcome in
Arlington and its ancestors. All parties at the table in a negotiation over a
conditional grant have good reasons to take into account the value of diversity
in their decision. There is not yet any convincing explanation of why state and
local officials would systematically under-value diversity as compared to other
goods, especially in light of the possibility that local taxes might substitute for
burdensome federal dollars. I agree that, in theory, a court might be licensed to
reject local decisions to accept funds where there is obvious political-process
failure. However, it is hard to see how a court could reliably make that
judgment even in individual cases, given the thicket of conflicting factors
identified above.
V.

CREDIT, BLAME, AND FISCAL PRESSURES (OR LACK THEREOF?)

My second-best story about official incentives to respect the need for
decentralized government so far neglects two other potential federal values that
may be served by curtailing conditional federal spending. In this Part, I
consider accountability and vertical cost exporting. On the accountability
front, I argue that concerns that federal grants may confuse voters about whom
to credit or blame for policy outcomes are largely overblown except in one or
two special cases. Where local jurisdictions would be unable to self-finance
their residents' preferences for essential local services, or are unable to obtain
funds for less-vital services because of outside constraints, there is a stronger
argument that the state official should not be "blamed" for the consequences of
accepting federal funds. Similarly, on the exporting question, where local
governments are needy, there is an inference that Congress would be able to
more easily export the costs of regulation. Thus, the bulk of this Part questions
whether these two scenarios ever arise. I conclude that they are, at best,
seldom seen in the modem United States. That suggests little need for a
judicial role in protecting local government from Congress.
A.

Accountability and Coercion

Federal mandates to state officials raise the possibility that voters will
ultimately blame the state officials for any bad outcomes, thereby distorting the
political process at both national and local levels. 196 Some commentators have
argued that the same dynamic is at play in conditional grants.' 97 State
196See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
197See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 16, at 825-27 (arguing the voter

confusion point could be applied to all intergovernmental arrangements, but stating that this
is a reason to believe the argument proves too much); McGinnis & Somin, Federalism vs.
States'Rights,supra note 20, at 91; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 48-50 (1988); Stewart,
supra note 22, at 958; Note, No Child Left Behind, supra note 148, at 902-03.
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decisions to accept funds subject to Congress's conditions may confuse voters
about whom to blame for the burdens that result. 98 Evidently, the suggestion
is that voters ought properly to blame Congress rather than their local
official. 199
Standing alone this voter-confusion story is not very persuasive. It may be
true that voters will in part blame their local officials for the results of
conditional grants, but that is not confusion at all. It takes two to contract, and
local officials who make bad deals should be held to account for them, whether
200
those deals are with trash-collection contractors or Congress.
One might construct a more persuasive accountability argument based on
Professor Baker's claim that Congress often effectively coerces states into
accepting federal offers. 20' This argument might posit that state officials
should not bear blame for accepting the offer they cannot refuse. The
difficulty is that Baker sees coercion in virtually every federal-state
exchange. 20 2 She claims that states are so hard-pressed to raise funds that they
20 3
must accept federal grants.
It is doubtful that situations such as those offered by Baker, in which state
officials are reluctant to raise their states' own revenue, are coercive in any
meaningful sense. 20 4 If government services are too expensive at the state

198 Hills, CooperativeFederalism,supra note 16, at 826; McCoy & Friedman, supra note

4, at 124; Siegel, supra note 149, at 1657; Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox, supra note

16, at 485; Stewart, supra note 22, at 958; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 22, at 1360;
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 203 (2002); Note, Federalism, Political
Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1994) [hereinafter

Note, Federalism];Note, No Child Left Behind, supra note 148, at 902-03.
19'See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 4, at 124-25; Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox,
supra note 16, at 485; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 22, at 1360-61; Zietlow, supra note
198, at 203; Note, Federalism,supra note 198, at 1420, 1429.
200 Cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 100

(2001) (arguing that officials remain free to point out to their constituents that they are not
responsible for decisions of other officials). Notably, in recent political events voters seem
to have had little trouble in blaming what they perceive as maladministration of the war in
Iraq on President Bush's administration as well as the Congress that voted to authorize it.
In any event, as I have noted before, careful institutional design can largely cure any
structural distortions in the correct allocation of political accountability. Galle, Getting
Spending, supra note 11, at 200-02.
201 Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1936-39.
202 Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending and States' Rights, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 104, 106 (2001) ("[T]he federal government has a monopoly power
over the various sources of state revenue, which renders any offer of federal funds to the
states presumptively coercive." (emphasis added)); see Baker, Conditional Spending, supra
note 22, at 1936-39; Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 519-21.
203 See Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1935-38.
204 See Engdahl, supranote 4, at 82-83.
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level, then a state government could simply choose not to provide them. If
they are essential services, the federal government can provide them instead.
In essence, it seems as though Baker's point really is that accepting federal
dollars is politically cheaper for state officials than raising funds themselves,
along the lines illustrated with the figures in Part III above. 20 5 This more
modest claim would not buttress any argument about accountability. The
accountability concern is that voters will mistakenly blame state officials for
federal officials' choices. If state officials have themselves chosen, out of
political expediency, to piggyback on federal efforts, it is difficult to see why
20 6
any blame voters attach to the state officials would be misplaced.
To be fair, there are some situations that would present a closer question.
Imagine, for example, a region where citizens cannot afford to provide truly
essential services for themselves. In this region, the central government does
not provide those services, and the local government is severely constrained in
its revenue-raising capacity for reasons beyond its own control. In this
scenario, it may be unfair for voters to blame their local government for any
conditions the central government attaches to its grants. 20 7 A large measure of
the uncertainty here is based on the problem that concepts like "blame,"
"choice," "coercion," and "republican government" are not easy to define, at
least not without controversy. 20 8 I am willing to concede here that close
judicial scrutiny may well be appropriate in situations that would squarely
present the need to make such judgments. However, those situations do not
likely arise with any frequency in the United States, as Part V.C illustrates.
B.

Accountability and Vertical Cost Exporting

If Congress can oblige state governments to bear the cost of implementing
federal policies, then Congress does not internalize its own costs. The federal
government may then produce too much regulation or regulation that is

205 Cf Baker & Berman, Getting Off the Dole, supra note 5, at 520, 535-36

(acknowledging that states may have a "choice" to decline funds, but arguing that as a
normative matter, the states' choices are unfairly narrow).
206 Perhaps the argument in response would be that voters will attach too much blame to
their state officials, relative to some outside, objective standard of political
blameworthiness.
But any such argument would depend on a theory of political
accountability that to date no one on either side of the spending debate has articulated.
207 Cf Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1492-96 (arguing that conditions attached to grants of
aid may be deserving of closer judicial attention if political failures result in the federal
government assuming too much power relative to ideal constitutional design, and that such
an arrangement might be described as "coercive" in some sense).
208 See Siegel, supra note 149, at 1656. Professor Baker straightforwardly acknowledges
the difficulty of defining these concepts; indeed, one of her arguments for her own approach
to the Spending Clause is that it presents a bright-line alternative that approximates her
sense of the best notion of coerciveness. See Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at
1972-74; Baker & Berman, Getting Offthe Dole, supra note 5, at 485, 521-22.
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inefficiently priced. 20 9 Voters may also be induced to shift responsibility from
local government to Congress, because it appears that Congress can
accomplish its ends at lower cost. 2 10 Thus, as Bruce La Pierre has argued, one
way to understand the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence is as an effort
21
to ensure that Congress internalizes all of the tax cost of regulation. '
This cost-exporting rationale seems to have little bite when it comes to
conditional spending. 21 2 The costs of implementing policy by means of
conditional spending are often quite large because of opportunities for strategic
behavior by individual states.21 3 Individual states, particularly those which are
confident the federal government cannot act without their cooperation, can
"hold out" for payoffs that exceed their costs. 2 14 Part IV analyzed a number of
other political economy considerations that tend to weigh against the
possibility that local officials will "discount" the costs Congress seeks to shift
to them. As a result, those costs will be passed back to Congress as the payout
price for accepting any accompanying conditions. Finally, to the extent that
Congress does succeed in exporting some of its costs, it does so at the price of
sharing credit for any beneficial outcomes with state officials. 21 5 This will tend
to diminish the political rewards that federal lawmakers realize from
regulating, and therefore constrain the overproduction or inefficient production
216
of regulation.
In any event, for either of these rationales one does not need to rely on broad
predictions about institutional behavior or national circumstances. The states'
fiscal standing can be tested empirically. Even if we cannot get an exact
209 See Siegel, supra note 149, at 1644.
210 Again, this may be largely another way of restating the diversity argument. See supra
Part IV.B.
211

See D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National PoliticalProcess-

The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 644-46

(1985); cf Stewart, supranote 22, at 966.
212 Cf La Pierre, supra note 211, at 658-60 (arguing that cost exporting is not a concern
where the federal government requires a state to act as a condition of the federal
government's refrain from preempting the state, on the theory that if the state refuses the
federal government it would in fact have to pay costs of preemption).
213 See Hills, CooperativeFederalism, supra note 16, at 880-83.
214 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 11, at 188-89.
215 Cf Volden, supra note 61, at 218-19 (arguing that local governments expend their
own funds on top of federal grants in order to ensure they will receive some credit for
programs, and may turn down some grants inorder to avoid sharing credit).
216 There also is an argument that there are some federal goods we should be happy to
see "over-produced." For example, if we think that for other political-process reasons
Congress does not ordinarily do enough to protect the rights of oppressed or neglected
political minorities, then cost exporting would be a way of subsidizing more expansive
federal efforts. If those costs are borne by state governments who themselves underproduce rights regulations, then the state governments probably have little grounds for
complaint.
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diagnosis, we can at least take the states' fiscal temperature. In particular, we
can examine data on what states do with the money they get from federal
grants. I take up that challenge in the next Section.
Testing the Coercion and ExportingHypotheses

C.

As outlined in the last two Sections, there are two plausible arguments for
restraining state agreements to accept conditional spending. In extreme
situations, state officials might be so desperate for funds that they feel
"coerced" into accepting and perhaps should not receive blame for accepting
the conditions attached to a federal grant. 2 17 Alternatively, Congress might use
conditional spending to export the costs of regulation. 218 This Section subjects
both of these claims to testing against existing empirical research. In addition,
reviewing the states' fiscal standing may shed some light on the extent to
which their own-source revenues may reduce the appeal of grants, as outlined
in Part III.
1.

"Flypaper" Effects as Measures of State Fiscal Standing?

Both of these accountability arguments ultimately depend on further claims
about the states' fiscal conditions. 2 19 The coercion point arises convincingly
only where it is genuinely difficult for states to raise funds for essential
services. As for the danger of cost-exporting, that possibility could logically
arise only where Congress can persuade a state to regulate (as a condition of a
grant) for less than it would cost the federal government to regulate directly. It
is difficult to analyze or predict the relative cost structures of different levels of
government, particularly because decentralized regulation may have efficiency
gains that counter-balance any centralized economies of scale, depending on
program design. 220 However, as Part III showed, if federal money looks
substantially "cheaper" than locally-generated funds, state officials may be
22 1
willing to accept federal projects at a discount.

17 See supra Part V.A.
218 See supra Part V.B.
219 Cf Adler, supra note 6, at 1208 ("The degree of coercion imposed by a particular
program also may vary from state to state, depending on relative social and economic needs
and conditions as well as on each state's independent capacity to address the need without
federal aid.").
220 A complicating point here is that while it may be demonstrably cheaper to regulate at
one level or another, we have to be certain to compare the costs of similar quality outputs.
Federal regulation may be cheaper, but of lower quality, or vice-versa.
221 For example, suppose it would cost Congress $100 to implement the Widget
Protection Act of 2008 in the state of South Utopia ("SU"). It will similarly cost the SU
government $100 in real dollars to implement the Act. SU residents believe they receive no
benefit at all from the Act. However, Congress offers SU a $90 grant on the condition that
it will agree to administer the Act. Because of various discounting effects, SU lawmakers
perceive the cost of implementation as $80. I claimed in Part III that the determining factor
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Existing econometric studies on the "flypaper effect" might bear
significantly on both questions. Again, the flypaper effect is a wide-spread
phenomenon in which vertical grants induce the grant recipients to spend more
than expected on the targeted grant activity.222 One possible inference drawn
from these studies is that state and local governments are short of cash. 223 That
is, spending increases because the local jurisdiction prefers more services prior
to the grant but it is unable to generate the tax revenues to meet those
preferences. Thus, a persistent flypaper effect for essential government
services could strongly support at least one component of the coercion
argument - the claim that local government and local residents could not
obtain those services on their own.
Alternatively, the flypaper effect data might support the story that states
view federal money as "cheaper" than their own. For example, the economist
Jonathan Hamilton has argued the possibility that more efficient taxes at the
federal level cause the flypaper effect. 224 If federal taxation is more efficient,

the federal government can extract more money than states from the same base
(or they can extract the same amount of money at lower overall economic
cost). 225 Voters' marginal preference for government services should shift
in whether SU officials will accept the grant offer is their perceived cost of raising $90 from
the SU tax base. If they perceive the cost as less than $80, they will reject Congress's offer.
Congress must then bear the entire $100 itself. If SU perceives their tax cost as higher than
$80, they will accept the grant, and Congress will have succeeded in exporting some of the
costs of implementing the Widget Protection Act.
222 To review, we should expect that unmatched grants would on average have only a
weak impact on recipient spending. Giving a state of 1,000 people a $1 million grant is
fiscally identical to giving each resident $1,000. If residents generally prefer to spend eight
cents of each dollar on government services, then the grant will simply increase spending by
$80 per capita, or $80,000 of the $1 million, allocated in proportion to preferences for
various services. Tax cuts or spending reductions will "offset" the remainder. In the
flypaper effect studies, however, grants tended to increase spending by far more than the
existing rate, sometimes by as much as dollar-for-dollar (or, in rare cases, even more).
Additionally, grants tend to be spent largely in their targeted category, rather than being
redistributed according to existing distributions of government spending. See supra Part
II.B.
223 Cf Lutz, supra note 103, at 24 n.22 ("Low income communities, which have
relatively high [property] tax rates, may be constrained from their optimal education
expenditure from fear of losing their commercial real estate base.").
224 Jonathan H. Hamilton, The FlypaperEffect and the Deadweight Loss from Taxation,
19 J. URn. ECON. 148, 148-50, 153-54 (1986); see also Brennan & Pincus, supra note 104,
at 232, 238-39 (proposing a model for the flypaper effect based on "differential tax
efficiency"); Volden, supra note 61, at 221, 224-25 (modeling the assumption that federal
grants are more attractive to local governments when the federal government is more
efficient at raising funds).
225 See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of
Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293, 303 (2003); Hamilton, supra note 224, at 153
(explaining how individuals avoid state taxes by moving away from the jurisdiction or
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upwards when revenue is raised through federal instruments, because their tax
226
price in effect is lower than it was when the state levied their taxes.
Hamilton's research on flypaper data suggests that federal taxes may literally
be cheaper than local taxes.
We might be able to tell a similar story about perceived tax costs. Federal
revenues could potentially derive from sources the local taxpayers perceive as
imposing a smaller economic burden. 227 That, in turn, might incline officials
to substitute federal grant dollars for local revenues. Flypaper studies would
not tell us anything directly about the relative discount rates of local taxes as
compared to the perceived burdens of any given grant condition, because they
deal with unconditional, unmatched grants. But, if the perceived economic
burden account held up, it would at least give us significant information about
the likely attitude of voters about local taxes. Large flypaper effects would
suggest that the discount rate for local taxes is small or negative, diminishing
the likelihood they would constrain decisions to accept funds. If nothing else,
these results might offer a starting place for judicial scrutiny of conditional
grant transactions. Instances of large flypaper effects in response to federal
grants might occasion more careful consideration of the terms of the grant
conditions.
Unfortunately, the theoretical picture of the flypaper effect is rather
muddled. Critics of the efficiency theory argue that it explains only a very
small portion of observed flypaper effects. 2 8 Some studies show only
temporary flypaper effects or none at all. 229 Further, there are a variety of
explanations for the observed data, perhaps none of them entirely inconsistent

purchasing goods in other jurisdictions, thereby decreasing the revenue efficiency of state
taxes); Volden, supra note 61, at 224-25.
226 See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 225, at 306, 308; Brennan & Pincus, supra note
104, at 236, 238; Hamilton, supra note 224, at 153.

Here is another simple numeric

example. Suppose South Utopian ("SU") citizens prefer to spend $.08 per dollar of their
personal income on government services paid for with SU tax funds. To obtain that $.08 in
tax, the SU government in fact causes other economic distortions that result in an actual
economic burden of $.12 per dollar on each SU citizen.

So the citizens actually were

willing to pay $.12 per dollar for services, but received only $.08 per dollar in value. Now
suppose that federal taxation of $.08 per dollar, combined with attendant distortions,

produces a burden of only $.10 per dollar on SU citizens. If the federal government gives
SU a $1 million grant, SU citizens should be willing to spend more of it than their own
income. They can spend more and still bear only a $.12 per dollar burden. To be precise,
they should be willing to spend 80% of $.12 (.08/.10 = x.12), or $.096 on the dollar.
227 Cf Fisher, supra note 99, at 342 ("[Fliscal illusion may cause individuals to perceive
different tax increases than those that actually occur or individuals may respond to tax
increases on the basis of some perceived use of the money.").
228 Peter Mieszkowski, Comments on Chapter 5, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 157, 15960 (John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994).
229 See Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 339-42; Gordon, supra note 103, at 1773.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:875

231
with the others. 230 In the next Section I try to sort these issues out.

2.

The Flypaper Data

By one count there are more than ten theories to account for observed
flypaper effects. 232 One set of hypotheses, as I noted, suggest that grant
recipients increase expenditures because federal dollars are cheaper or
represent tax funds they could not themselves easily raise. 233 A number of
others posit rational or irrational voter ignorance combined with political
opportunism by public officials as the cause of the flypaper effect. 234 In these
views, voters fail to notice grants, value them improperly, or do not realize that
235
grant dollars could be viewed as equivalent to their own tax payments.
Public officials take advantage of these misperceptions to expand their own
230 See

Fisher, supra note 99, at 324; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 220-22; Lutz,

supra note 103, at 1.
231 A reasonable question for the reader to ask at this point would be whether there might

be a more direct measure of a state's fiscal situation. Unfortunately, the most common
economic tools for measuring state "fiscal capacity" and "financial need" are themselves
problematic in a number of ways. See Stephen M. Barro, State Fiscal Capacity Measures:
A Theoretical Critique, in MEASURING FISCAL CAPACITY 51, 81-84 (H. Clyde Reeves ed.,
1986); Max B. Sawicky, The "Total Taxable Resources" Definition of State RevenueRaising Ability, in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS:
TECHNICAL PAPERS 63, 78-94 (1986); Tanenwald, supra note 127, at 4. A particular
problem for our purposes is that there appears to be no neutral way of measuring the
financial "needs" of a state without first defining what forms and levels of services state and
local governments ought to provide. Id. at 7. For instance, the leading measure of "need"
simply analyzes the costs a state would incur if it provided the same bundle of services
offered by the "average" U.S. state. Id. at 7-8. As authors of these studies note, many states
that appear "needy" under this metric in fact may have a preference for a low level of
government services, such that they could comfortably provide those services even under
fairly tight budgets. Id. at 16, 19-22. Thus, the appeal of the inferential flypaper approach I
suggest here is that it might account for the local jurisdiction's own perception of its fiscal
capacity and its "need" for government services. It is worth noting, though, that the
flypaper studies deal almost exclusively with unconditional grants, so that applying their
findings to conditional grants does require a bit of an inferential leap.
232 See Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 342-47.
233See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 225, at 306, 308; Brennan & Pincus, supra note
104, at 230, 232; Hamilton, supra note 224, at 153; Lutz, supra note 103, at 24 n.22.
234 Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 580-81; Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 34849; William R. Dougan & Daphne A. Kenyon, Pressure Groups and Public Expenditures:
The Flypaper Effect Reconsidered, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 159, 160 (1988); Lars P. Feld &
Christoph A. Schaltegger, Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of
Intergovernmental Grants, 123 PUB. CHOICE 147, 151, 167 (2005); Filimon et al., supra note
103, at 52; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 223; Lutz, supra note 103, at 29-30; Mitias &
Turnbull, supra note 103, at 347-48; Turnbull, supra note 103, at 3-7.
23 See Feld & Schaltegger, supra note 234, at 149-52; Filimon et al., supra note 103, at
57; Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 223.
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operations without having to raise taxes. 236 Alternatively, even fairly virtuous
public officials serving less-than-fully-informed voters might direct grant
dollars to spending rather than tax cuts out of fear that federal funds might dry
up in the near future, leaving local officials in the position of raising taxes to
237
return to their original level of funding.
Two other explanations draw on the fact that federal grants are a repeated
game. 238 In one of these theories, the argument is that all grants are really
implicitly matching grants. 239 Remember the flypaper effect is an expected
result, rather than a surprise, for matching grants. 240 If local officials spend
their money in a way that displeases the grant-makers, they will not receive
money next time. 241 Therefore, the grantees spend money largely as the
grantor allocates it (at least if there is any evident monitoring by the grantor).
In another repeated game story, grants sometimes result from political effort on
the part of local constituencies, who local officials reward in order to
encourage similar efforts by others in the future. 242 As a result, some portion
243
of the grant sticks to the categories urged by the successful local coalition.
One challenge for all the theories is to explain not only why overall local
spending increases in response to a grant, but also why spending increases in
the actual category targeted by the grant. 244 By themselves the underinformed
voter narratives struggle with that point. 245 It is not clear why local officials
would choose to spend their "free" resources only on the activities encouraged
by the grantor. The hypothesis is that officials will take advantage of voter
ignorance to use federal money for their own purposes. It would be a very
large coincidence if the purposes of the federal officials authorizing the grant
236 See

Bae & Feiock, supra note 107, at 580-81; Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 52,

57.
237 Bailey & Connolly, supra note 102, at 343, 346-47; James W. Fossett, On Confusing
Caution and Greed: A PoliticalExplanation of the Flypaper Effect, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 95, 9597, 106-07 (1990); Volden, supra note 61, at 227; cf Gordon, supra note 103, at 26 ("If
districts do not anticipate permanent changes in revenue, they may be hesitant to increase
total spending."). Thus, this version of the theory depends on the assumption that the
political costs of raising taxes tend to be larger than the political rewards of cutting taxes.
There is a fair amount of empirical research to support that assumption. E.g., Bae & Feiock,
supra note 107, at 585; Fossett, supra, at 107-09; Louise Marshall, New Evidence on Fiscal
Illusion: The 1986 Tax "Windfalls," 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1336, 1342 (1991); Mitias &
Turnbull, supra note 103, at 355, 361.
238 See Knight, supra note 103, at 71-72 (modeling a legislative bargaining model of
intergovernmental grants); Singhal, supra note 104, at 8 n.9.
239 See Baicker, supra note 103, at 150; Fisher, supra note 99, at 338.
240 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
241 See Baicker, supra note 103, at 152.
242 See Singhal, supra note 104, at 549.
243

Id.

244 See Hines & Thaler, supra note 29, at 222.
245 See Singhal, supra note 104, at 549.
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and the local officials accepting it happened to align. Even if both grantor and
grantee officials are responding to what they perceive as the spending areas
likely to deliver the largest political rewards, individual official preferences
among services, the information available to the two sets of officials, and the
constituencies most closely tied to the officials should all vary considerably.
The cash-strapped states theories are more compelling on this point.
Proponents of those notions could posit that officials need federal funds when
there are real public needs going unmet, and therefore, a large political reward
available to whomever can meet them. Both grantor and grantee officials, in
an effort to capture some of the reward pool, target their grant money for those
needs.2 46 The size and obviousness of the political reward available overcome
the differences in preferences, constituencies, and information among the
various levels of officials such that their spending decisions converge.
The repeated game adherents also have a good explanation for categorical
stickiness. In the repeated game stories, federal grants stick categorically
because otherwise, in the next round, there would not be a federal grant, or not
as much of one. 247 A challenge for these theorists, however, is the increasing
number of studies showing that flypaper effects often have only a limited
duration. 248 Money may stick to a category for a year or two, but by the third
2 49
year of a grant program the funds are offset according to classical theory.
That result is surprising because, if anything, one would expect smaller
flypaper effects in the first years of a grant, as it can take time to ramp up a
large new spending project. 250 Perhaps the argument for repeated game
theorists is that the attention of Congress or the local coalition has wandered;
coalitions are notoriously difficult to hold together. 251 However, in these
studies Congress is still interested enough, and coalitions still active enough, to
produce billions of dollars in grants. It is hard to understand why the implicit
matching component, or need for rewards, would diminish so quickly when the
funding itself does not.
On the other hand, the theory that federal funds are cheaper than state

246

Cf Knight, supra note 103, at 72 (observing that state officials may help federal

officials determine how best to allocate grant dollars); Volden, supra note 61, at 226
(arguing the grant-maker will target grants to subject areas in which there is high public
demand).
247 See Baicker, supranote 103, at 152; Singhal, supra note 104, at 259.
248 Gordon, supra note 103, at 1773.
249 Id. at 1773, 1787-88, 1790-91; Lutz, supra note 103, at 19. But see Singhal, supra
note 104, at 562 (finding the flypaper effect persisted in an instance where the source of
funds was litigation against a tobacco company rather than a grant from another government
entity).
150 See Lutz, supra note 103, at 19.
251 ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 57

(1982); Steven G. Calabresi, PoliticalParties as MediatingInstitutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.

1479, 1512-15 (1994).
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dollars, or that the states are otherwise in need of federal money, is also a poor
fit with short-duration flypaper effects. It is difficult to imagine that the
relative efficiency of federal and local tax collection, or the fiscal condition of
localities, changes dramatically in the span of a few years, no matter how
successful the grant program.
Thus, the underinformed or irrational voter and repeated games arguments,
in combination, fit the available evidence as well or better than the efficiency
and financial need stories. When voter misinformation about grants presents
the opportunity for increased government spending, the spending is sticky by
category because there is also an implicit matching component or a need to
reward active constituencies. At the same time, implicit matching or rewards
are insufficient by themselves to increase spending in a targeted category,
because once local voters understand their actual fiscal situation they will
prefer to return most of the grant money to their own pockets in tax cuts (or to
reallocate it in other categories). In the first few years of a grant, especially
one that is of relatively low salience for voters, voters may not notice or
understand it, but over time better-informed constituents teach or de-bias
them. 252

Studies of New Hampshire's court-imposed school financing

252 See Filimon et al., supra note 103, at 52 (considering but rejecting this possibility);
Lutz, supra note 103, at 24 n.22; Marshall, supra note 237, at 1342 (discussing the role of
the media in informing voters and constituencies about grants); cf Baicker, supra note 103,
at 156 n.15 (noting that some stickiness of categorical spending may result from the fact that
budgets of different agencies are allocated by different committees of the legislature, so that
legislators do not initially consider budgets of other agencies when setting the budget level
of the agency overseen by their own committee).
Professor Singhal argues against a "learning story," pointing to evidence from her own
work indicating that anti-tobacco spending increased only after states received funds from
their lawsuits against tobacco companies, rather than during the course of the litigation.
Singhal, supra note 104, at 559-60. She suggests that if increased spending is the result of
improved voter information, the lawsuit itself should have served that function. Id. That
argument mistakes the point of the "learning" hypothesis. The theory emphasizes that what
voters do not understand is the fiscal situation of their government. There was nothing
about the tobacco litigation Singhal studied that would have improved voter information on
that front.
More challenging for my theory is Singhal's finding that flypaper effects were persistent
for five years. Id. at 562. However, as she notes, the funds at issue in her study derived
from successful lawsuits against tobacco companies, rather than intergovernmental grants.
Id. at 563-64. This difference may well be significant. Part of what voters may learn over
time is the fact that the source of the intergovernmental grant includes tax dollars they have
paid to the grant-making government. This could make them less inclined to be taxed, in
effect, twice for the same services: once by the grant-maker, and again by the grantrecipient. Since the recipient is smaller, it is politically easier to offset the received grant
with reduced local taxes than to reduce the grant by the amount of their contribution. In any
event, Singhal's version of the repeated-game story is, like the combination repeatedgame/voter-learning story I tell here, consistent with the view that state and local
governments are free to decline federal grants.
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realignment, which showed little flypaper effect in localities even from day
one, support this theory.253 The grants were the dominant political story in the
state, 254 so there was never a window of voter misinformation through which
"sticky" spending could climb.
This is not to say that other explanations of the flypaper effect are invalid.
Indeed, one econometric study showed fairly convincingly that in Mexico,
where regional per capita income was on the order of a few hundred dollars,
the flypaper effect likely resulted from local inability to raise money from local
citizens. 255 The taxpayers were simply too poor to pay for their own
government. I acknowledge, then, that the true causes of a measured flypaper
effect may vary widely depending on underlying circumstances.
As a result, my point is simply that, absent poverty on the scale exhibited in
some places outside the United States, the existence of a flypaper effect does
not establish that the states need federal money or prefer to substitute it for
their own. Put another way, there is no clear evidence that the states are overeager to accept federal dollars. Nor could courts easily use the presence of a
flypaper effect as a shorthand method for triggering closer scrutiny. I am not
claiming to have irrefutable evidence that the states are not over-eager to
accept federal dollars. My argument, however, is that absent some compelling
showing of a federal interest, state and local governments should be free to
make agreements with Congress without restriction by federal courts.
D. Indirect Tax Supportsfor State and Local Government
Finally, a few words on why it would have been surprising to find evidence
that local governments are in need of federal assistance. In particular, I want
to highlight some unconditional sources of federal support for state and local
governments generally overlooked in the debate over conditional spending.
The U.S. Tax Code is the source of many of these forms of unconditional
support. Nearly all modem grants from Congress come with at least some
minor strings attached.2 56 For example, at a minimum, essentially every
federal grant comes with the condition that individuals who misdirect those

253 Lutz, supra note 103, at 3, 25.

254 Id. at 7-8 (discussing New Hampshire's unique town hall system, which creates
involvement on the individual level).
255Pablo Camacho Guti~rrez, Essays on Mexican Fiscal Federalism: A Positive Analysis
145-47 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin),
available
at
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2005/camachogutierrezp 13970/camacho
gutierrezpl3970.pdf, see also DAVID N. KING, FISCAL TIERS: THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-

LEVEL GOVERNMENT 114-17 (1984) (noting the possibility that flypaper effects may result
from highly impoverished local government). For a discussion of the challenges of
decentralized revenue-raising in developing economies, see Oates, supra note 101, at 114244.
256 See Baker, ConditionalSpending, supra note 22, at 1918.
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funds for personal gain will be subject to federal prosecution.2 57 In contrast,
many federal tax provisions provide fiscal support to state and local
government with few or no conditions.
Consider, for example, § 501 of the Tax Code, which exempts non-profit
entities from taxation. 258 One explicit rationale for the exemption (and
accompanying § 170 deductions for contributions to select non-profits) is that
it encourages production of quasi-governmental services: services that local
government might otherwise have to provide. 259 Non-profit schools, hospitals,
and other civic associations produce hundreds of billions of local services, and
260
there is strong evidence that they would produce less without tax exemption.
Several other provisions offer somewhat more targeted subsidies for local
government activities. Most prominently, § 164 allows a federal deduction for
state and local income, property, and (in some cases) sales taxes paid by
individuals and corporations. 261 State and local bonds are exempt from federal
tax, although there is some debate whether local governments are able to
capture all of the benefit of the tax advantage attached to the bond.262 The
low-income housing tax credit offers subsidies for developing or rehabilitating

257

See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 603-05 (2004) (deciding on the

constitutional validity of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2000), which imposes federal criminal
penalties on anyone who bribes a government agent, where the government agency has
received federal benefits greater than $10,000 via a grant or other form of federal
assistance).
258 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). Of course, this section does impose some conditions on the
taxpayer in order to obtain exempt status, but none on the local governments who need not
duplicate the services offered by the non-profits.
259 There are also other explanations for the deduction. For some excellent surveys of
the field, see Rob Atkinson, Theories of the FederalIncome Tax Exemption for Charities:
Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 402-26 (1997); Johnny Rex
Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan:Deducting Earmarked Transfers to
Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243,
1282-96 (2002); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1396-1433 (1988).
260 See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72-75 (1981).
261 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the arguments in favor of
and against the explanation of § 164 as a subsidy for local governments, see Brian Galle, A
Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax
Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673, 680-701 (2007).
262 See Brian D. Galle & Ethan Yale, Can DiscriminatoryState Taxation of Municipal
Bonds Be Justified?, 117 TAx NOTES 153, 154-55 (2007); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal
Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1044-46
(1983); Douglas J. Watson & Thomas Vocino, Changing Intergovernmental Fiscal
Relationships:Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on State and Local Governments, 50 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 427, 428-50 (1990).
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homes. 263 And lastly, a variety of federal tax subsidies for home ownership
2 64
increase home values, expanding localities' property tax base.
It is not immediately clear whether these subsidies outweigh the other fiscal
pressures on states. For example, as I have outlined elsewhere, there is a
vigorous debate among social scientists over federal deductibility.2 65 Some
scholars believe one of the aims of the deduction is to counter-balance the fact
of interjurisdictional tax competition. 266 If local officials know that voters
need not pay the full cost of the taxes they impose, the officials will not fully
internalize the political cost of those tax increases, and therefore, in theory,
raise them higher than they would otherwise. 267 But there have been a number
of writers, including top tax officials in President Reagan's Treasury
Department, who argue the deduction actually goes too far in encouraging
local spending. 268 That is, they believe § 164 by itself more than compensates
for any fiscal pressures on state and local government. 269
If these

263

26 U.S.C. § 42 (2000). For a review of the low-income housing tax credit and its

mechanics, see Andrew Zack Blatter & Elena Marty-Nelson, An Overview of the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit, 17 U. BALT. L. REv. 253, 255-70 (1988); Sagit Leviner,
Affordable Housing and the Role of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program: A
Contemporary Assessment, 57 TAX LAW. 869, 871-75 (2004); U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development, HOME and Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC),
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/ (last visited Aug. 13,
2008).
264 Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the FederalIncome Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. REv.
319, 331 (2003).
265 Galle, supra note 261, at 676-81, 685-87.
266 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 160, at 248 & n.196; see Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal
Federalism and Tax Progressivity:Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and
Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1389, 1410, 1431 (2004); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
The Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REv. 907, 92732 (2000). Recall that competition among states for mobile capital and high-income
taxpayers tends to reduce state and local tax levels. E.g., Oates, supra note 101, at 1121 &
n.3. For a more general discussion of central government fiscal counters to the problem of
local tax competition, see Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, The Efficiency Consequences
of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Distortions, 8 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY
119, 120-22 (2006).
267 See Michael Smart, Taxation and DeadweightLoss in a System of Intergovernmental
Transfers, 31 CAN. J. ECON. 189, 206 (1998); Tannenwald, supra note 127, at 4.
268 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH 63-64 (1984); Christian Kelders & Marko K6thenburger, Tax Incentives
in Fiscal Federalism:An IntegratedPerspective3-4 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/-ces/Marko/FiscalFederalism.pdf.
269 I acknowledge, however, that the Treasury offered their views before it was clear for
how many households the Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT") would effectively eliminate
the § 164 deduction. The AMT obliges taxpayers above a certain income threshold to
recompute their tax without many deductions, including § 164. 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(2006). Critically, that threshold is not indexed for inflation, so budget projections now
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commentators are correct, then it would be surprising if there were evidence
that states are over-eager to accept federal money. State and local government
may, indeed, already over-produce government services.
270
One could argue this point cuts in favor of restrictions on federal grants.
Again, competition among states for mobile resources may increase pressure
on state government to perform more efficiently, or, at a minimum, to hold
taxes below the level that empire-building officials might prefer.2 7 1 If states
already perceive themselves as fiscally comfortable, and grants add to that
comfort, then grants may have the effect of dampening what might otherwise
be welfare-enhancing competition. 272 For instance, in the extreme case in
which all revenue-raising is centralized, there is no interstate tax competition at
all.
Even in this extreme case, however, states should still be able to compete.
States can compete using not only taxes, but also benefits, so that in the
absence of tax competition one would expect competition for favorable rules
and efficient services. 273 In some instances this shift away from tax
competition can actually increase overall welfare. 274 Nor is it clear that grant
levels short of 100% of a state's funding needs will reduce tax competition.
Indeed, one might expect tax competition to increase as states become more
fiscally solid, because the state is better able to afford generous tax breaks for

suggest that in short order it will be more expensive to repeal the AMT than to repeal the
entire rest of the individual income tax. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REVENUE & TAX POLICY
BRIEF, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM Tax 1, 8 (2004), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.

cfm?index=5386&sequence=0.
270 1 am grateful to Ilya Somin and Todd Zywicki for raising this argument.
271 PETERSON, supra note 160, at 17-18, 25-26. Regarding the effects of tax competition
on tax rates, see generally Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Leviathan and Capital
Tax Competition in Federations, 5 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 177 (2003) (analyzing how tax
competition both horizontally between states and vertically between various levels of
government may increase tax rates in a competitive environment).
272 There is an extensive debate in the public finance literature over whether this
competition is, on balance, welfare-enhancing. For summaries of the conflicting views, see
Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and European Union: ContrastingPerspectives, 31

REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133, 133-43 (2001); John Douglas Wilson & David E.
Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1065, 1088 (2004);
George R. Zodrow, Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10
INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 651, 651-66 (2003).
273 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to

Federalism,9 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 205, 224-25 (2001).
274 See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative
Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 97,

104-05 (John

Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) (arguing that the existence of tax competition
may induce states to set superoptimal levels for other regulation, in order to avoid drawing
in capital in excess of local infrastructural capacity).
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its most mobile taxpayers. 275 Thus, to the extent that interstate competition
enhances national welfare, there is little indication that the fiscal effects of
2 76
federal grants and other federal supports reduce that competition.
On a final note, the proliferation of relatively unconditional supports for
local government raises an additional question about the logic of the clear
statement rule. If the Constitution obliges the federal government to avoid
coercing state governments, why does it follow that the solution is restrictions
on grant conditions? Why is it not the solution for courts simply to require
more unconditional financial support for states, to the point that states
obviously will be free to accept or decline further grants? It seems clear that
courts would refuse to consider, as beyond their institutional capacity, claims
about what level of funding a local government needed in order to meet the
minimum level of functionality "guaranteed" by Article IV. 2 77 But if claims
about the coerciveness of grants ultimately turn on the same question, then
they should similarly be outside a federal court's proper functions. While I
remain somewhat open to the argument that Congress should internalize the
costs of its own regulatory decisions, the "coercion" and cost-exporting
arguments for judicially constraining conditional spending seem untenable.
CONCLUSION

In sum, my analysis here suggests there is little justification for the clear
statement rule. The rule, like other forms of constitutional enforcement,
displaces the expressed preferences of political actors, including both federal
grant-offerors and state and local grant-acceptors. Any analysis of the clear
statement rule, including Professor Tribe's political-process story, must
account for that fact by pointing to some flaw in the decisions officials make in
offering and accepting grants that might justify federal judicial intervention.
Yet, there is no real evidence that state decisions to accept funds fail to
preserve the values that federalism protects, even if that is not what in fact

275 Moreover, although I have for the most part here assumed that federal grants will be

offered in the worst possible form, in reality Congress has a number of incentives to
cultivate competition among states. Competition enables Congress to gather experimental
data about alternative approaches which it can then appropriate for use in national
legislation, as well as to diversify the risks of such experiments. And, of course, if
competition in fact increases national welfare, and officials are judged on the performance
of the economy, congresspersons have at least some reason to be interested in the welfare
effects of grants.
276 On the other hand, it is possible the architecture of some fiscal supports may reduce
competition by undermining the exit or participation incentives of local taxpayers. See
Galle, supra note 261, at 696-701. But that is a question of program design, not one about
the merits of grants generally.
277 U.S. CONST. art. IV; ef Stewart, supra note 22, at 930-31 (mentioning that courts have
traditionally left claims about proper or just allocation of societal resources to the political
process).

2008]

FEDERAL GRANTS, STATE DECISIONS

motivates the state officials. Officials have their own reasons for preserving
diversity. The perceived discount on raising funds locally often counterbalances the costs of accepting federal money. And there is little evidence that
state officials perceive difficulty in raising funds through their own tax
systems, especially in light of other federal tax supports, such as the federal
deductibility of many state and local taxes.
Of course, the reader may wonder whether any of this matters at all. After
all, we might think of the clear statement rule as just a sort of default rule.
Perhaps if Congress views it as an unwise rule, Congress might simply enact
conditional spending statutes with a disclaimer providing that all the provisions
of the statute are to be interpreted purposively, or that some rules may be
binding on states even if not expressly stated in the text of the statute. That, of
course, assumes that the costs of overcoming legislative inertia are relatively
low. 2 78 Additionally, even if Congress acted, it is not clear that the Supreme
Court would let stand efforts to displace the clear statement rule. If the Court
views the clear statement rule as a form of constitutional enforcement, or as
necessary to protect its own institutional prerogatives, the Court is unlikely to
give it up easily. For instance, some commentators believe Congress can
displace the Gregory clear statement rule only one statute at a time.2 79 Well,
what is a "statute"? The Court could demand an enormous amount of
specificity for provisions supposedly setting aside the clear statement rule: a
super-clear statement rule. 280 It is a safe bet that, absent some reconsideration
by the Supreme Court, the issue of the clear statement rule is here for a long
stay.

See Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 65, at 855-58 (arguing that many supposed
default rules may simply become legislative rules, due to difficulty in mobilizing Congress
and other actors to displace them).
279 E.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REv. 2085, 2097 (2002).
278

280 For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld,
Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
FederalPower, 58 DuKE L.J. 1933, 2005 (2008).

